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Qualitative, Quantitative, and Integrative Conservation
Jamison E.Colburn*

INTRODUCTION

Conservation is being overtaken by the same quantitative thinking
that dominates risk regulation today. "Risk regulation," traditionally
conceived, "addresses the risk of harm that technology creates for
individuals and the environment."' In this light, environmental
statutes like the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), Clean Water Act ("CWA"),
and Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") are the legal extensions
of probabilism and the "rational" pursuit of public health and
safety-with conservation statutes like the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") following right behind them.2 They each invest power in an
administrative agency by authorizing it to prohibit behaviors of a
certain kind which it finds too risky given the probabilities of harmful
consequences. 3 Before they can act, however, the agencies normally
must make certain required findings or determinations, based on
evidence and usually according to disparate criteria fixed (or implied)
* Professor of Law, Penn State University. My thanks to Professors Dan Tarlock and
Daniel Mandelker for organizing the symposium and for inviting me to take part.
1. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK ix (2003).
2. See, e.g., Office of the Science Advisor, U.S. EPA, EXAMINATION OF EPA RISK
ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 2 (2004), http://www.epa.gov/OSA/pdfs/ratf-final.
pdf ("This process is highly interdisciplinary in that it draws from such diverse fields as
biology, toxicology, ecology, engineering, geology, statistics, and the social sciences to create a
rational framework for evaluating environmental hazards."). The National Research Council
explicitly recommended that risk analysis become the paradigm in conservation over a decade
ago. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 99112 (1995) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND THE ESA]. That paradigm famously separates "risk
assessment" from "risk management," largely in an effort to insulate the former from the
political vicissitudes of the latter. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND
DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT 241-42 (2009) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND
DECISIONS].
3. See, e.g., SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 26-58 (describing the evolution
and use of risk assessment at EPA).

HeinOnline -- 32 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 237 2010

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 32:237

by the governing statute(s), subject to judicial review.4 Not
surprisingly, these laws have become-with help from administrative
law-enmeshed in the parametric controversies of epidemiological
inference,5 cost/benefit analysis, 6 and time discounting, 7 to say
nothing of the metaphysics of statistical lives 8 and a slew of other
ethical dilemmas that come along for the ride when we try to quantify
risk.
With the rise of "ecosystem services" 9 and other quasimonetizable values in conservation, not to mention the increasing
salience of "measurable goals," 10 it seems as if we are entering
conservation's quantitative age. Not so long ago, the concept of risk
was foreign to conservation practitioners." Today, "biodiversity" has
become conservation's lingua franca, linking it directly to-if not
collapsing it into-the risks of extirpation/extinction and the
ecosystemic upsets it can bring. In this Article, I use the ESA to
locate an important pivot we have reached in conservation more
generally, a point at which we will choose (wittingly or not) how we
face the looming crises of biodiversity loss. The more we learn about
evolutionary and molecular genetics, biochemistry, geoclimatology,
and many other dimensions of ecosystem composition and function,
the more able we are to express the questions of conservation as
matters of probability and risk. Yet, the more we express
conservation's questions as matters of risk, the less able we seem to

4. See generally A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005).
5. See generally Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland, Causation and Causal
Inference in Epidemiology, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 144 (2005).
6. See generally MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND
ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2008).
7. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds. 1995) [hereinafter RISK
VERSUS RISK].
8. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).
9. See, e.g., J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007).

10. See, e.g., Timothy H. Tear et al., How Much Is Enough? The Recurrent Problem of
Setting MeasurableObjective in Conservation, 55(10) BIOSCIENCE 843, 847 (2005).
11. See John Harwood, Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis in Conservation, 95 BIO.
CONSERV. 219 (2000) ("[L]ess than 1% of the 1400 plus papers published in the joumals
Biological Conservation and Conservation Biology since January 1995 include the words 'risk'
or 'uncertainty' in their title, and nearly half of those involve [three authors].").
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be to grasp and communicate them as meaningful and momentous
choices in life. This is doubly true for the conservation statute with
the broadest scale and scope: the ESA. This is not to say that people
who deal in risk and probabilistic reasoning do not know what is
important. To the contrary, my claim is that when we shift expressive
frames toward quantification and probabilism, we tend to lose our
collective grip of these choices as tangibly democratic questions. This
stems from much more than the mere innumeracy of our median
voter. In this Article, I use the evolution of ESA practice to
summarize the much larger landscape of conservation's troubles in
contemporary democratic societies. In my view, this can be summed
up as the following progression and consequent imperative:
qualitative thinking inevitably begets quantitative ambitions, but the
real work of practical problem-solving demands that we find ways of
integrating the two into a symbiotic-and therefore reciprocalrelationship.
I. Two ASSUMPTIONS: A PROLOGUE
The last three decades have established two undeniable realities
for conservation. Because the past cannot predict the future, 12 I
present them here as assumptions going forward. To whatever extent
they prove inaccurate, so much the better: it will mean more
possibilities exist than I suspect. First, it seems clear that the support
of the public fisc for acquiring and/or regulating natural resources for
the sake of their conservation is, at best, level and more likely
diminishing in proportion to recognizable needs. As a society, we are
identifying urgent conservation needs much more rapidly than we are
investing in them. 13 Secondly, though related to the first assumption,
12.

If only our financial regulators had kept this fundamental premise in mind over the

last decade. Cf PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK

(1996) (tracing the cultural history of risk and risk analysis in financial ordering from 1200 to
the present and conjecturing that people will forever mistake inductive prediction for deductive
truth).
13. One response to this framing of the assumption is to advocate for vastly expanding the
scale and scope of regulatory or "police" power so that natural resources not owned/possessed
by the public can be conserved nonetheless. For both normative and practical reasons explained
in Parts 1, II, and III below, I regard this as a tragically incomplete-though certainly not
wholly mistaken-response to our predicament.

HeinOnline -- 32 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 239 2010

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 32:237

the costs of lawmaking and administration now drive the institutions
that define legal practice and this is nowhere more manifest than in
biodiversity conservation by the federal government.14 As
administrative actions of all kinds have become enmeshed in conflict,
procedure, and factual uncertainty, the agencies charged with the
public's conservation agenda have shifted strategies to make use of
increasingly administrative mechanisms, driving more and more of
conservation practice further and further from public view. Part I
unpacks these two framing assumptions.
A. Public Investment in Conservation Will Not Keep Pace with
IdentifiedNeeds
For the ten year period from 1992-2001, federal and state
authorities "spent" about thirty-two billion dollars on conservation
land acquisition alone. 15 For the ten year period from fiscal year
1996-2004, non-land-acquisition expenses incurred by the federal
government in connection with specific listed taxa averaged $562.9
million per fiscal year.1 6 Of course, compared to a thirteen trillion
dollar economy literally predicated on cost-externalization and the
extraction, liquidation, and consumption of natural resources (both
here and abroad), this number-which has been leveling off latelyis cause for concern. With the possible exception of the Forest
Service's seemingly intractable "roadless area" conservation
14. From about 1964 to 1976, public lands and other natural resource legislation in this
country was thoroughly remade, essentially creating a zoning system that allocates lands
according to a variety of use priorities and a range of use intensities, and which locked the
agencies administering these statutes under a variety of procedural obligations. See Jamison E.
Colburn, Habitat and Humanity: Public Lands Law in the Age of Ecology, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
145, 170-95 (2007).
15. See Jeff Lemer et al., What's in Noah's Wallet? Land Conservation Spending in the
United States, 57 BIOSCIENCE 419, 420 (2007). "Acreage figures would be a good complement
to dollars spent, but such figures were not available, and they too can be double-counted by
conservation partners." Id. at 421. This level of funding is well below the "estimated $5.4
billion to $7.7 billion per year needed to create a national network of habitat conservation areas,
and it is unlikely that private and local government sources will completely fill the gap." Id. at
422.
16. The ESA section 18 fiscal reports are an example of hopelessly shifty accounting.
From 1996-2004, however, FWS at least reported on identifiable "per-species" expenditures
other than land acquisition-a category that then shifted again in Fiscal Year 2005.
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initiative," or the recent (fitful) expansion of the National Wilderness
Preservation System, 18 the trends on public lands have been against
the acquisition and/or protection of nature for its own sake. 19
Increasingly severe droughts and fires, marked increases in
recreational intensity, and continued wildland sprawl all
counterbalance these comparatively small preservation projects.2 ° A
positive growth curve in "units" of the National Wildlife Refuge
System 21 is a far cry from positive growth in total area or "primary
constituent elements 22 of healthy, resilient landscapes.23 The
17. The Roadless Area Conservation Rule (a rule designed to prohibit the further roading
of inventories roadless areas within the National Forest System), promulgated at the end of the
Clinton Administration, has been embroiled in litigation and Forest Service reconsiderations for
almost a decade now.
18. See Omnibus Public Lands Law of 2009, Pub. L. No. ill-li, to be codified
throughout Title 16 U.S.C.
19. The Forest Service's reasons for its roadless area rule were several, but habitat
conservation was among them. See U.S. Forest Service, Notice of Final Rulemaking, 66 Fed.
Reg. 3244, 3252 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294). The avowed objective
was to "prohibit[] road construction, reconstruction, and timber harvest in inventoried roadless
areas because they have the greatest likelihood of altering and fragmenting landscapes, resulting
in immediate, long-term loss of roadless area values and characteristics." 66 Fed. Reg. at 3244.
The "values or features" that were said to "often characterize inventoried roadless areas" were
(1) high quality or undisturbed soil, water, and air; (2) sources of public drinking water; (3)
diversity of plant and animal communities; (4) habitat for threatened, endangered, proposed,
candidate, and sensitive species and for those species dependent on large, undisturbed areas of
land; (5) primitive classes of recreation; (6) the provision of a "reference landscape"
independent of human alteration; (7) traditional and sacred cultural sites/properties; and (8)
various locally defined unique characteristics such as geological formations. Id at 3245.
Throughout the Notices of the rulemaking, these eight categories were referred to as "roadless
area values." The inventory was ultimately comprised of 58.5 million acres (almost two percent
of the nation's land), although a common attack mounted to the finalized rule highlighted the
fact that no definitive maps of these areas were created specifying their boundaries. See, e.g.,
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1244-46 (D. Idaho 200 1).
20. See Robert B. Keiter, Breaking Faith with Nature: The Bush Administration and
Public Land Policy,27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 195 (2007).
21. Many have noted the swift growth of the National Wildlife Refuge System, both in
acreage and in administrative units, since its establishment as a separate "system" in 1966. See,
e.g., ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A
CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 64-76, 237-49 (2003).

22. In designating listed species' "critical habitat," the Services are required to identify
"the specific areaswithin the geographic area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed...
on which are found those physical or biological feature (I) essential to the conservation of the
species and (1) which may require special management considerations or protection," and any
"specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed. ..
upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential to the conservation of the
species." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (emphasis added). The Services have settled on identifying
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landscapes that conservation managers are actually confronting today
are dominated by the intermixture of jurisdictional authorities, the
diverse spatial and temporal scales of change and human activity, and
geoclimatic changes that are now under the study of legions of
scientists. Most recently, the "adaptive ecosystem management" tide
seems to have rolled out as fast as it came in, due at least in part to
the informational enormity of ecosystems and our obvious
incompetence regarding things so vast and unstable.24
Since 1988, the ESA has made fiscal reporting a core part of the
Fish and Wildlife Service's duties. The 1988 Amendments added
new ESA section 18 and required annualized accounting of
expenditures made by all federal agencies and by states for the
"conservation" of listed species; the Amendments also required that
this accounting be reported to Congress. As these reports have been
compiled, several numerical baselines have shifted, making year-toyear comparisons difficult.2 6 One thing is easily inferred, though: the
fiscal data Congress has been collecting about the ESA's several
different programs has been growing finer-grained and is being
managed more shrewdly. Indeed, frustratingly, expenditures by
species and action-type are perhaps the two best data streams to
which Congress has access where conservation is concerned today.
The conservation movement's reaction to the growing deficits in
public capacity and support has been, in essence, to privatize. The
Nature Conservancy, the Trust for Public Land, and an everexpanding population of local land trusts have been the fastest
the "primary constituent elements" in such "specific areas" including space for individual and
population growth; food, water, air, light, minerals, or other nutritional or physiological
requirements; cover or shelter; sites for breeding, reproduction, rearing of offspring,
germination, or seed dispersal;" and other habitats "representative of the historic geographical
and ecological distribution of the species." 50 C.F.R. 424.12(b)(1)-(5) (2008).
23. See Jamison E. Colbum, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife HabitatLaw, 57 ALA. L.
REV. 417 (2005).
24. See Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Back to the Future: Ecosystem Dynamics and Local
Knowledge, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL

SYSTEMS 121 (Lance Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
25. Pub. L. No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 et seq., codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1544(l)-(2).
26. The major complication for any trend analysis is what is counted as expenditure "for"
a listed species or pursuant to the ESA as opposed to other programmatic responsibilities. Many
funding synergies and/or overlapping agency missions deprive any such accounting of its value.
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growing sectors of the conservation movement for decades.27 Besides
the public shortfalls, though, the trend has been fueled in good part
by the anti-government rhetoric that has pervaded our public sphere
for generations. 8 Fear of government is at least as powerful an29
influence in our political culture as the fear of environmental lOSS.
Regardless of Washington's peaks and valleys, the relative decline of
conservation investment seems to be a reality going forward and will
likely complicate conservation's future as much as it has its
adolescence.
B. The Rise (and Rise) of Agency Informality: Soft Law's Empire
Since 1984, when Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., was decided, the federal courts have moved
through various stages of evolution in the deference they afford to
agency interpretations of law. In applying Chevron, the lower federal
courts have struggled to define their institutional role,30 to apply a
poorly designed and poorly administered judicial test, 3' and to map
out an incompletely theorized normative and institutional landscape
that includes not only legislation, but also administration, political
initiative, and judicial precedent.32 The more we encounter agency

27. SALLY FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE: THE LIMITS OF LAND ACQUISITION AS A
CONSERVATION STRATEGY, 1780-2004 (2005); RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND
TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003).

28. See generally FAIRFAX ET AL., supra note 27. "The hallmark of American politics...
is the distinctive way in which power has long been distributed along an exceedingly complex
array of persons, associations, and institutions that are not easily categorized as fundamentally
either public or private." William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical
Introduction,in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 23,
27 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
29. Cf COREY ROBIN, FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA 200-25 (2004) (tracing
the fear of government throughout American political and constitutional traditions).
30. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006).

31. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (tracing the history of Supreme Court applications and constructions of
Chevron and finding pronounced irregularities).
32. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64 (2008); Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson,
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interpretations of law in all their diversity, the fewer assurances we
have about the practical authority of agency actions within our legal
traditions. The result has been an effusive-if also inconclusivedebate surrounding foundational normative questions about our
administrative state.33 The questions run from why we ought to defer
to agency authority, 34 to when and why Congress actually delegates
authority to agencies, 35 to the assumptions underlying any such
normative analysis 36-and a host of gradations in between.
Not surprisingly, in the ESA-as in nature-hybridity has been
the trend. Sorting out law, policy, and discretion seems to grow more
challenging every year. The statute itself offers little help. ESA
section 4 speaks of "guidelines" and recovery "plans" that the
Secretary must "establish," "develop," and publish in the Federal
Register.37 It obliges the Secretary to create and publicize such
norms, but it is silent on their enactment or force as law. So they have
come to occupy a variety of cryptic stations in our legal system. They
are each a type of agency "rule" shy of the "regulations" codified in
Law for States: InternationalLaw, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791
(2009).
33. Elsewhere, I argue that the evolution toward increasingly informal mechanisms of
lawmaking is gradually undermining traditional notions of agencies as sources of law. See
Jamison E. Colburn, Agency Interpretations,82 TEMP. L. REV. (forthcoming).
34. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008).

35. Compare Bamberger, supra note 32 (drawing out the tensions inherent in ascribing
purposes to Congress when allocating interpretive authority between courts and agencies), with
Lisa Shultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 553 (2008) (setting out a series of
hypothetical circumstances in which Congress "likely delegates authority to agencies" based on
public choice theory).
36. A variety of methodological disputes now engulf the claims of "rational choice" social
science and, with it, positive political theory as applied in law. Compare Daryl J. Levinson,
Empire-Building Government in ConstitutionalLaw, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005) (contesting
the claim that government officials have actual incentives to engage in self-aggrandizing
behaviors), with Yochai Benkler, Commons-based Peer Productionand Virtue, 14 J. POL. PHIL.
394 (2006) (challenging rational choice theory's explanation of motivation-biased cognition
with evidence from digitally networked environments); see generally CROLEY, supra note 34;
Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character:A CriticalRealist Perspective on the
Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 13 (2004); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).

37. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(h) ("The Secretary shall establish, and publish in the Federal
Register, agency guidelines to insure that the purposes of this section are achieved efficiently
and effectively."); id. § 1533(0 ("The Secretary shall develop and implement plans ... for the
conservation and survival of endangered species .... ").
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the Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR"). 38 They seem like more
than the transient "interpretations" we so often encounter in litigation,
guidance, notices, circulars, etc. Pinning them down with definite
labels from traditional principles of administrative law may be more
trouble than it is worth. Internationalists have a term, "soft law,"
which was first used to refer to weaker, non-binding instruments like
U.N. General Assembly resolutions. Yet it has gradually expanded in
step with an evolving category of "quasi-binding" instruments that
now dominate international law.39 If there is a domestic equivalent,
the Services' guidelines and plans are in the mix.
Of course, the "protective regulations" the Secretary must develop
"as [s/he] deems necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of [listed] species" '40 were clearly meant to possess the
force of law. 4 1 But this rigid system of prohibitions, though still
prominent in our collective consciousness of the ESA,4 2 is mediated
by the many plans, policies, guidelines, and manuals 43 the Services
maintain. They indirectly govern the scope of ESA sections 7 and 9,
the Act's two duty-creating parts. Thus, a series of policies published
in the FederalRegister, constantly followed and cited as controlling
38. On the proliferating varieties of such "rules," both under our own Administrative
Procedure Act and within the European Union's nascent administrative system, see Peter L.
Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America Can Learn
from Europe, and Vice Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645 (2005).
39. See, e.g., Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499,
510-14 (1999). My thanks to Dan Tarlock for reminding me of this term's place in international
law.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
41.

See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GutDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 51 (4th ed.

2006); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002).
42.

See STEVEN L. YAFFEE,

PROHIBITIVE

POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE

FEDERAL

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982). Since Yaffee wrote, the Act has been amended (and
interpreted) in ways that have made it much more discretionary and flexible than it was as
originally implemented. See Jamison E. Colbum, Canus (Wol) and Ursus (Grizzly) Recovery:
Taking the Measure of an ErodingStatute, 22(2) NAT. RES. & ENV'T 22 (2007). But the ESA is
still routinely characterized as a rigid, prohibitory law.
43. Besides the library of plans, policies, guidelines, and manuals on ESA practice, see,
e.g., Consultation Handbook (1998), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/consult
ations/s7hndbk/s7hndbk.htm, and the Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook (1996),
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/hcp/hcpbook.html, the Services have an equally
well-developed body of such materials on the management of wildlife refuges. See Robert L.
Fischman, From Words to Action: The Impact and Legal Status of the 2006 National Wildlife
Refuge System Management Policies,26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77 (2007).
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by agency personnel though never codified in the CFR, is what
structures the statute's implementation. Indeed, they structure how
section 4's listing factors 44 are weighed and compared, 45 how relevant
biological entities are identified,46 how available information is
gathered and assessed gauging the threats facing these entities, 47 and
how the conservation efforts already in place are evaluated.48 None of
44. The five listing factors in ESA section 4(a)(l)(A)-(E) are well known and oft-cited.
Less well known, however, are the "bas[e]s for determinations" set out in ESA section 4(b)(l)
for listing and ESA section 4(b)(2) for critical habitat designations. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(2). There, the Act requires that the Services:
shall make determinations ... solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial
data available ... after conducting a review of the status of the species and after taking
into account those efforts, if any, being made by any State orforeign nation, or any
political subdivision of a State orforeign nation, to protect such species, whether by
predator control, protection of habitat and food supply, or other conservation
practices,within any area under itsjurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis added). This mandate that other jurisdictions' "efforts" and "conservation
practices" be taken "into account" complicates the Services' decision making substantially. See
infra note 106 and accompanying text.
45. Beginning with a draft and then a finalized set of "listing priority guidelines" in 1983,
the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") has used a factored matrix to balance taxonomic
distinctness, magnitude of threat, and immediacy of threat in its listing decisions. See Fish and
Wildlife Service, Notice: Draft Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery
Priority Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,756 (Apr. 19, 1983); Fish and Wildlife Service, Notice:
Final Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 48 Fed.
Reg. 43,098 (Sept. 21, 1983).
Taxa that receive low priority numbers on this matrix usually are consigned to "candidate"
status behind other, higher priority taxa to be listed more quickly. See, e.g., Defenders of
Wildlife et al. v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002) (challenge to FWS finding that
Canada lynx's listing was "warranted but precluded" by higher priority candidates for listing).
In the event that such a prioritization is successfully changed as a result of judicial action, see
id. at 22-24, taxa can be listed ahead of other priorities the Services deem more urgent-but the
Services maintain that prioritization is required by ESA section 4(h)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(h)(3).
This has led to a 'governance by lawsuit' mentality within FWS and in the public's perception
of its programs. See, e.g., Katrina Myriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human
Dominion over Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 490, 496 & n.30 (2008).
46. See Notice, Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population
Segments Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722 (Feb. 7, 1996) [hereinafter
DPS Policy]; Notice, Policy Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species
Act to Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991) [hereinafter ESU Policy].
47. See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species
Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994) [hereinafter Peer Review Policy]; Notice of
Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information Standards Under the Endangered Species Act,
59 Fed. Reg. 34,271 (July 1, 1994) [hereinafter "Information Standards" Policy].
48. See Notice, Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When Making Listing
Decisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,100 (Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter "PECE"].
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these policies has ever been codified. Most of these have also been
published
in the Federal Register, but only in the form of a
"notice. ' 49 And each is routinely followed as if it were law, raising
some troubling questions about the normativity of the judgments they
embody and convey. If an agency action creates law, fully authorized
and in lockstep with authority delegated by Congress, then virtually
complete deference is warranted-absent constitutional issueswhen and if that action is reviewed in court. 5° Administrative law has
been unsettled at least since United States v. Mead Corp.51 as to when
agency interpretations are law in this sense, though.52
As the tempo of ESA litigation has quickened, these puzzles have
grown more urgent. For example, in a remarkable opinion-which
now constitutes binding circuit precedent reversible only en banc or
by the Supreme Court-the Ninth Circuit held that the Services'
"Distinct Population Segment" ("DPS") policy possesses sufficient
force of law to be due Chevron-style judicial deference and that that
level of deference is enough to shut down even meritorious
challenges to the agencies' interpretations of the Act's "species"
concept.53 The holding was made all the more remarkable by the fact
that the Ninth Circuit, like other courts, now routinely sets aside
agency factual findings and conclusions of law on particular listing
49. The FederalRegister cannot publish any document "unless it is the official action of
the agency concerned," I C.F.R. § 5.4(c) (2008), but the publication category of "notices"
includes any and all "miscellaneous documents applicable to the public . . . and other
information of public interest" which are not Presidential documents, rules and regulations, or
proposed rules. Id.§ 5.9.
50. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 & n.9 (1977); Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Ros. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984). To the extent agencies
and courts are agents whose actions reflect their considered judgments, this kind of deference is
tantamount to rule-following, thereby making the rule-follower obedient to the rule-maker. And
establishing authoritative sources and the rules they make is arguably the core of law's purpose
or point. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 16-48 (Oxford 1990)

(1975) (linking this theory of law as a matter of rules to a more general theory of practical
reason).
51. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
52. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833
(2001); Michael Herz, JudicialReview of Statutory Issues Outside of the Chevron Doctrine, in
A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 125 (John F. Duffy &

Michael Herz eds., 2005).
53. See Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140-43
(9th Cir. 2007).
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decisions made pursuant to the DPS Policy. 54 Thus, the DPS policy

and the conservation planning it orchestrates have lately become a
matter of substantial conflict, intensely questioned agency judgments,
and vague, indeterminate legal standards that can either immunize the
agency or expose it to rigorous judicial review depending on the
timing and format of the challenges.55
Other policies and the agency interpretations they embody are
perhaps turning in this direction as well.56 If they are, it is a mixed

blessing at best for conservation, because it signals to the
bureaucracies involved that they should establish their policies and
judgments in a non-standard rule form that cannot be challenged as
58
such57 and is neither fully nor easily recognizable as such.
Agencies, of course, often wish to protect themselves against legal
challenges involving the controversial judgments they must make.
Yet, together with the internal staff-to-staff communications that
constitute the agencies' working flows, these policies now exert
formative influences on conservation as carried out by the federal
54. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2003);
National Wildlife Federation v. Norton, 386 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Vt. 2005); Humane Soc'y of
the U.S. v. Kempthome, 579 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008).
55. See, e.g., Cook Inlet Beluga Whale v. Daley, 156 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2001);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); Nat'l Assn. of Home Builders,
340 F.3d at 835; Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 553; Humane Soc'y of U.S., 579 F.
Supp. 2d at 7; Cal. State Grange v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
(E.D.Cal. 2008); see also Doremus, infra note 63; Ruhl, supra note 9 at; Daniel J. Rohlf,
There's Something Fishy Going on Here: A Critique of the National Marine Fisheries Service's
Definitionof Species under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 617 (1994).
56. Recovery plans under ESA section 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f), are denominated in the
Act as a "plan" requiring "public notice and opportunity for public review and comment." Id.
§ 1533(f)(4). Elsewhere, these plans, and indeed the concept of "recovery," are virtually
missing from the text of the statute-although FWS guidance on and attitudes toward recovery
planning have tended to confirm the importance of the plans once written. See, e.g., Fund for
Animals v. Babbitt, 967 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting challenge to a plan designating
population targets for Grizzly bear that argued plan was too fixed and result-oriented given the
state of scientific knowledge).
57. Unlike many of the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has lately taken a
decidedly more skeptical view of so-called pre-enforcement review challenges to rules and
rulemaking proceedings. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009); Ohio
Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
58. See generally Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modem Administrative Law:
Changing Administrative and Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 101
(2009).
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government. They are becoming entrenched in the Services' culture
and cognition.
As normative mechanisms which may be authoritative,
prescriptive, and preemptive to greater or lesser degrees, ESA section
4's "guidelines" and "plans" are growing in practical importance as
well. Clearly, the agencies are following these "rules" (in the sense of
that term set out in the Administrative Procedure Act) in too many
ways to count.59 And so are reviewing courts-sometimes. And this
just deepens the curiosity. In Batterton v. Francis,6 ° the Supreme
Court contrasted the universe of "administrative interpretations of
statutory terms," which it said were "given important, but not
controlling, significance," as against "regulations with legislative
effect," which it said a "reviewing court is not free to set aside ...
simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different
manner." 6' Taking that as a benchmark, where do the guidelines,
policies, and plans of the ESA fall on our spectrum of legal norms?
The challenge going forward is at least as much about how courts and
other legal actors answer this question-how they recognize and
interpret such agency norms-as it is about anything else in the law
of conservation. And the intersection of this question with the forms
of practical reason in conservation more generally (whether
qualitative or quantitative) will be one of the most active crossroads
in the coming decades. Part II uses the saga of the Canada lynx to
explore the resource constraints of ESA practice today.
II. MORE ART THAN SCIENCE: THE ESA AT THIRTY-FIVE AND
COUNTING

As conservation's flagship, the ESA is often revered and reviled
for the very same attributes. Part II argues, however, that it is failing
structurally the further we move into our quantitative age.
59. See, e.g., LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES
DESKBOOK 223-616 (2d ed. 2010) (collecting policies, guidance, and manual provisions
currently in force).
60. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).

61. ld.at424-25.
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A. Repeal by Starvation?Feedingand Caringfor Your Pit Bull

62

The ESA has long been revered for its powerful bite while at the
same time being faulted for its genetic predispositions. Apart from
the fact that what it protects in nature is, by necessity, exceptional,
ESA actions have proven to be too deliberate and contentious, too
sequential, and too fixated on the parts of nature already in
jeopardy.6 3 The statute screens its agents' "actions" through legal
processes that are arduous, routinized, and costly-leaving its
administrators to face some rather perverse incentives. The reward
for plowing through all the listing petitions and backlogged
protections for at-risk taxa is more of the same: triage, scarcity, and
conflict.64 Looking ahead, this vortex threatens to consume more and
more resources without ever reaching the root causes of the
environmental degradations at issue, and that is a tragedy in the
making.65
One focal point in this confusion of means and ends has been the
periodic ritual known as the "Candidate Notice of Review"
("CNOR").6 6 From 1975 to 1996, FWS periodically published an
aggregative list of taxa that "should be taken into account in
environmental planning,

,

67

_lists

of taxa, in other words, that were

sense.68

Since 1996, however, "candidates"
"at risk" in some general
have been only those taxa for which the Services have "on file
62. See George Cameron Coggins, An Ivory Tower Perspective on EndangeredSpecies
Law, 8 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 3, 3 (1993) (calling ESA a "pit bull" of a law).
63. "It is widely agreed that the inability to provide protection before the late stages of
decline is a serious failing of the ESA." Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Futureof
the EndangeredSpecies Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 404 (2004).
64. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction?, THE NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009,
at 53.
65. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the EndangeredSpecies Act: Building Bridges to
the No-Analog Future,88 B.U. L. REv. 1, 32-42 (2008).
66. See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Notice: Review of Native Species that Are
Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,804 (2009).
67. Review of Vertebrate Wildlife for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, 47
Fed, Reg. 58,454, 58,454 (Fish & Wildlife Serv., Dept. of Interior Dec. 30, 1982).
68. See Notice of Final Decision on Identification of Candidates for Listing as
Endangered or Threatened, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,481, 64,481 (1996) ("[FWS] has decided that ...
[f]uture lists of species that are candidates for listing under the [ESA] will be restricted to those
species for which the Service has on file sufficient information to support issuance of a
proposed listing rule.").
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sufficient information on biological vulnerability and threats to
support a proposal to list as endangered or threatened but for which
preparation and publication of a proposal is precluded by higher
priority listing actions. ' 69 In December 2008, this list numbered
251.70 The move in 1996 refined FWS's approach to candidate status,
and it now maintains that taxa may be added to its candidate list
"based on an evaluation of ...status that [they] have conducted on
[their] own initiative, or as a result of making a finding on a petition
to list .. .that listing is warranted but precluded by other higher
priority listing action." 71 Confusingly enough, the Fisheries Service
still takes the broader approach to "candidate" identification.72
The structure and function of the "candidacy" threshold are
critical for several reasons. First, it sharpens the focus down to those
forms of ecological disturbance that measurably threaten ESArelevant biological entities. As we have seen most recently with the
listing of the Polar bear and the related upset of the ESA section 7
consultation rules,73 the zoning of risks within or beyond the
Services' scope of operations is increasingly fully decisive of ESA
choices.74 Second, there are many more biological entities in peril
69. Part 424 defines "candidates" as "any species being considered by the Secretary for
listing ...but not yet the subject of a proposed rule." 50 C.F.R. § 424.02(b). See, e.g., Review
of Plant and Animal Species That Are Candidates or Proposed for Listing as Endangered or
Threatened, Annual Notice of Findings on Recycled Petitions, and Annual Description of
Progress on Listing Actions, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,808 (2001). The adoption of this criterion for
"candidate" status in 1996 joined the internal and petition processes for purposes of
prioritization and required findings under the ESA. See Notice of Final Decision on
Identification of Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,481
(1996). Of course, it is only an informal "guideline" that sets out the priorities in listing. See
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority
Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 43, 098, 43, 102 (1983).
70. See Review of Plant and Animal Species That Are Candidates or Proposed for Listing
as Endangered or Threatened, Annual Notice of Findings on Recycled Petitions, and Annual
Description of Progress on Listing Actions, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,176, 75,177 (2008). Another fifty
taxa had pending listing proposals. Id.
71. Id. at 75,176.
72. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Establishment of Species of Concern
List, 69 Fed. Reg. 19,975 (Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.,
Dept. of Commerce Apr. 15, 2004).
73. See infra notes 178-209 and accompanying text.
74. See Eric Biber & Cynthia Drew, Stopping the Conservation:Amended ESA Section 7
Regulations Put Species at Risk, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 139 (2009), http://elq.typepad.com/
currents/pdf/currents36-01 -biber-2009-0122-pdf.
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today than can possibly be listed and managed as such.7 5 Finally, as a
practical matter, petitioning the Services to list more and more taxa
each fiscal year 76 is simply exhausting the appropriations Congress
sees fit to provide and indirectly hastening the use of fiscal levers
(budgetary processes being the most politically opaque of all 77) to

hide from public view
what the "median legislator" might wish to
78
avoid doing publicly.

Now, as to taxa brought to the Services' attention by private
petition, ESA section 4(b)(3)(C) expressly requires a defined
"warranted-but-precluded" finding that is subject to separate judicial
review should the Services conclude that the species is simply not
significant enough to add to the federal lists. 79 It also requires that
any such finding be reviewed by the agency at least every twelve
months--establishing a rather paradoxical status quo for many
species. 80 Being kept off the list of protected species represents a
75. See, e.g., T.M. Brooks et al., Global Biodiversity Conservation Priorities, 313
SCIENCE 58 (July 7, 2006).
76. ESA section 4 provides that "to the maximum extent practicable, within 90 days after
receiving [a listing petition from an "interested person"] under [the APA's rulemaking petition
process] to add a species to, or to remove a species from" the endangered or threatened lists, the
Services "shall make a finding as to whether the petition presents substantial scientific or
commercial information indicating that petitioned action may be warranted." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(3). This ninety-day petition clock, together with the restrictions on information that
may be used in assessing such petitions, has bound the Services into a series of decision-making
"tunnels." See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
77.

See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 2-4 (rev. ed.

2000) (attributing the opacity of the budget process to its immense complexity, high stakes, and
uncertain procedural norms).
78. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Friends of the Wild Swan v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp.
1388, 1396-1400 (D. Or. 1996); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833 (9th Cir.
2001); Am. Lands Alliance v. Norton, 242 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2003); Sierra Forest Prods.,
Inc. v. Kempthome, 2008 WL 2384047 (E.D. Cal. 2008). All three of these courts concluded
that ESA section 4(b)(3)(C)'s requirement of a separate, identifiable "warranted-but-precluded"
finding entails a finding of sufficient particularity and detail as to enable effective judicial
review in accordance with the principles of State Farm. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C) (2000). The 1982 Amendments to section 4, which
completely overhauled the listing and petition procedures the Secretary must observe, seem to
have confused the agencies on taxa for which they possess sufficient information to make an
affirmative listing factor finding and taxa for which a valid and substantial petition has been
filed under section 4(b)(3) but which the Services elect to deny. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2000); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 254 F.3d at 838. After several
litigated cases, the plain text of section 4(b)(3)(B)-requiring a separate finding be published
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uniquely qualitative judgment, and it has in recent memory provoked
important litigation and cultural conflict. 81 Now, to be sure,
warranted-but-precluded candidates are not wholly outside the ESA's
influence. In a growing number of cases, the Services have used this
"candidate" finding to spur others into action, a conservation practice
I will outline below in Part IV.
Of course, as tragic as this "waiting room" may seem, the Act
itself anticipates it. 82 Indeed, Congress and the President together
have quietly jammed it full by depriving the ESA of the resources it
could now easily consume. When confronted, appropriations
decision-makers say they are merely preventing the ESA from
dominating all other public and private business with their
appropriations levers.8 3 And many struggles today are over the
relative priorities assigned to particular candidates-struggles the
Services often lose when they get to court. 84 Yet, because the listing
processes are bound by the Anti-Deficiency Act 85 and because of
annual appropriations caps Congress has placed on the listing
program specifically, including sub-caps on the critical habitat
outlining the agency's conclusions that other, higher priorities precluded listing the petitionedfor candidate-became manifest. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthome, 466 F.3d
1098 (9th Cir. 2006).
81. The Polar bear listing saga, both as a matter of litigation and for its role in the social
and political upheaval surrounding U.S. attitudes toward climate change, is discussed below.
See infra notes 178-209 and accompanying text; see also Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt,
146 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
82. ESA section 4(b)(3)(B)(i) empowers the Secretary to find that:
[t]he petitioned action is warranted, but that(I) the immediate proposal and timely promulgation of a final regulation implementing
the petitioned action ... is precluded by pending proposals to determine whether any
species is an endangered species or a threatened species, and
(II) expeditious progress is being made to add qualified species to either of the lists...
and to remove from such lists species for which the protections of this chapter are no
longer necessary.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
83. See, e.g., Katrina Miriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human Dominion
over Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 490,496-97 & n.30 (2008).
84. See, e.g., California Native Plant Soc. v. Norton, 2005 WL 768444 (D.D.C. 2005);
Cir.for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 466 F.3d at 1098; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Kempthome, 2008 WL 205253 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
85. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2004).
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program, 86 the notices of "review" have become periodic reminders
of our true predicament: the ESA's operability is becoming an
accident of timing and litigation, which now drive the fates of
specific taxa and habitat.87 In short, its scale and scope are becoming
functions of the scarcity of public investment in conservation. So the
CNOR ritual should prove at least this much: the ESA is now about
caged, muzzled power as much or more than it is about the damage it
causes when finally unleashed. Part II.B illustrates with an example:
the Canada lynx.
B. Mesocarnivores andLandscape Scale Conservation
Carnivores in general and mid-level carnivores in particular
routinely populate lists of Earth's most at-risk taxa.88 The Canada
lynx, a medium-sized forest carnivore, is perhaps the ESA's richest
case study in the accidents of timing, taxonomy, and threat
assessment. First identified by FWS as a candidate for listing in
1982,89 the lynx was and remains relatively abundant throughout the
boreal forests of Canada and Alaska. 90 In the contiguous United
9
States, however, its abundance has been much more uneven. 1
86. See Review of Vertebrate Wildlife for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species,
73 Fed. Reg. at 75,185 (proposed Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
87. Reviewing courts themselves recognize this. One of the first reported cases in which a
court reversed a warranted-but-precluded finding noted the "obscurity and indeterminacy in the
ranking process" and how "a species' priority level effectively determines whether or not it is
listed under the ESA." Friendsof the Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1391. At that point (FY '94),
FWS was still listing candidates with ranking priorities as low as "6" on their twelve point
scale. Id. In its 2008 CNOR, FWS explained that not even a listing priority ranking of "2" any
longer assured the taxa of a high enough priority for listing. See Review of Vertebrate Wildlife
for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, 73 Fed Reg. at 75186 (proposed Dec. 10,
2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17). Commentary now routinely spotlights the influence of
budgetary starvation. See, e.g., Wyman, supra note 45, at 495-99.
88. See, e.g., K. Ullas Karanth & Ravi Chellam, Carnivore Conservation at the
Crossroads,43 ORYX 1(2009).
89. See Review of Vertebrate Wildlife for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species,
47 Fed. Reg. 58,454, 58,460 (proposed Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
90. See James K. Agee, Disturbance Ecology of North American Boreal Forests and
Associated Northern Mixed/Subalpine Forests, in ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF LYNX IN
THE UNWTED STATES 39, 39-47 (Leonard F. Ruggiero et al. eds., 2000).

91. See Kevin S. McKelvey et al., History and Distributionof Lynx in the Contiguous
UnitedStates, in ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF LYNX INTHE UNITED STATES 207 (Leonard
F. Ruggiero et al. eds., 2000).
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Reliable data record the lynx's occurrence in twenty-four states going
back to at least the mid-1800s. 92 Lynx occurrence is closely
associated with conifer forest types, especially those comprising the
southern, alpine extensions of the boreal forest. 93 Lynx are also
thought to vary in abundance according to the cyclical expansion and
contraction of their foremost prey, the snowshoe hare, 94 although that
relationship is much more explicit in the northern parts of their range
than it is in the southern parts.9 5 The lynx remained a low priority for
FWS until it was the subject of a petition and then a lawsuit by a
collection of wildlife organizations beginning in late 1992.96 At the
same time this was going on, FWS was developing its policy on the
criteria for "distinct population segments," a taxonomic category the
Act recognizes but which biology does not.97 After the suits resulted
in remands to the agency for reconsideration in 1997,98 and again in
2002, 99 the lynx population of the contiguous United States was
finally listed as a "threatened" DPS through a "clarification of
92. Id. at 253. Confusions with bobcats render most data prior to the mid-1800s suspect.
Id.
93. McKelvey et al., supranote 91, at 253.
94. Cf Clayton D. Apps, Space-Use, Diet, Demographics, and TopographicAssociations
of Lynx in the Southern Canadian Rocky Mountains: A Study, in ECOLOGY AND
CONSERVATION OF LYNX 1N THE UNITED STATES 351, 352 (Leonard F. Ruggiero et al. eds.,

2000) (offering evidence that is mildly supportive of the conventional wisdom about lynx and
hare population synchronies).
95. Id. at 352-53.
96. See 12-Month Finding for a Petition to List As Endangered or Threatened the
Contiguous United States Population of the Canada Lynx, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,507 (1994)
(proposed Dec. 27, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17) (finding listing not warranted); 12Month Finding for a Petition to List the Contiguous United States Population of the Canada
Lynx, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,507 (proposed May 27, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)
(finding listing warranted but precluded under FWS listing priority guidelines).
97. ESA section 3, in defining "species," includes species, subspecies, and "distinct
population segment[s] of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16)
(2000). The interpretation of this term in the Act was the subject of great uncertainty and debate
within the listing agencies. See Maine v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 357, 377-79 (D. Me. 2003). It
was not until 1996-almost twenty years after the Act was amended to include the term-that
the Services adopted a joint policy setting out their "principles" for recognizing and, where
appropriate, listing DPS's. See Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate
Segments under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722 (Feb. 7, 1996).
98. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1997) [hereinafter
"Lynx I] (remanding "warranted-but-precluded" finding).
99. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
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findings" FWS published in 2003. 00° Without the petition and without
the litigation, the lynx almost certainly would have remained in the
waiting room to this day.' 0 1
Key to establishing the lynx in the lower forty-eight states as an
ESA-relevant biological entity was the use of the DPS concept' 0 2 and,
specifically, the presence of an "international boundary" bisecting the
range of the populations at issue. Indeed, the U.S./Canadian border is
what made the lynx DPS into a taxon even possibly meeting ESA
section 4's listing criteria. Without it, the lynx populations resident in
the contiguous United States just look like the southern-most edges of
a relatively healthy metapopulation centered in northwestern
Canada.0 3 The Services maintain in their DPS Policy, and in their
applications of it since 1996, that international boundaries dividing a
taxon may factor into the "discreteness" or the distinctness of a
population segment because international boundaries create
"differences in control of exploitation, management of habitat,
conservation status, or regulatory mechanisms."'0 4 Yet, ESA section
100. See Notice of Remanded Determination of Status for the Contiguous United States
Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,076 (proposed July 3, 2003)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). In the 2003 findings, FWS listed the population as
persisting in, or potentially being restored to, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming, and all other states with documented occurrences of lynx (Connecticut, Indiana,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
Virginia) as having only ever supported dispersers and/or as being presently "extirpated." See
id. at 40,080. Pennsylvania was later deleted as having been included erroneously.
101. Prior to the decision in Lynx I, FWS characterized the threats to the lynx population(s)
in the contiguous United States as both "imminent" and of "high" magnitude. See 62 Fed. Reg.
at 28,657. The relatively low listing priority was the result of its taxonomic status-because it
was neither a monotypic genus nor a proper "species." Id.at 28,657; cf Listing Priority
Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. at 43,103.
102. FWS's "DPS" concept is quite similar to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's "evolutionarily significant unit" concept for salmonid management. See
Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 56 Fed. Reg.
58,612 (1991). With each, the agencies have committed themselves to recognizing and listing
biological entities that are spatially, temporally, and/or genetically segregable from their wider
taxa-but only insofar as those entities are "significant" to their biological species or subspecies
(an approach some criticize) and are themselves at risk according to section 4(a)'s listing
factors.
103. Cf Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 18-21 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting
FWS finding that losses of range within the contiguous U.S. were not "significant" because
they were merely the dispersers from Canada).
104. 61 Fed. Reg. at 4725.
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4 undermines that very interpretation. Listing factor (D), "the
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms" (the factor to which
they attribute this criterion of discreteness), easily could justify the
use of state and local boundaries in identifying taxa as wellsomething the Services have repeatedly (though cryptically) refused
to do. t0 5 Indeed, it would make good practical sense to interpret
section 4 as linking listing determinations rather directly to the
10 6
strengths and weaknesses of existing "conservation practices."
Thus, the naked assertion that the Act ought to be implemented
without regard to local or state treatment of a taxon is neither a matter
of agency expertise, 0 7 nor a matter of clearly expressed
congressional intent, 10 8 nor even all that consistent with the Services'
actions elsewhere.'0 9 In reality, state, local, and private authorities
105. 61 Fed. Reg. at 4724 ("Recognition of other political boundaries, such as State lines
within the United States, would appear to lead to the recognition of entities that are primarily of
conservation interest at the State and local level, and inappropriate as a focus for a national
program."); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Norton, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (FWS's designated gray
wolf DPS was structured without regard to state lines and defended on those grounds). Most
often, the agencies repeat an expressed hope of the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works (which added the DPS language to the species definition in 1978) that DPS's be
established "sparingly" and with great caution. See, e.g., Cal. State Grange v. Nat'l Marine
FisheriesServ., at *50-54.
106. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); see supranote 44.
107. The courts seem fully engaged in assessing the agencies' "discreteness" judgments
according to the DPS Policy and have refused to simply accept, whatever the evidence or
argument, a bald assertion as to the "significance" of a discrete/distinct population. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Ass 'n of Homebuilders v. Norton, 340 F.3d at 844-50 (invalidating listing of DPS
because, apart from labeling the population within the United States "significant," FWS did not
explain its significance to its wider taxon).
108. The absolute weakest form of legislative history-that printed by a committee after
enactment of the subject legislation-is where the agencies have claimed to find Congress's
expressed hope that they list populations not essential to their wider taxa only when the taxa are
mostly outside the United States and the imperiled populations are within it. See 61 Fed. Reg.
4725; Maine v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 357, 383 (D. Me. 2003). The report in question, Senate
Report 96-151, published in connection with the 1979 amendments, denominated its discussion
of listing discrete "populations" an "other point" that did "not warrant amendments to the law,"
but rather just "some clarification" in the form of legislative dicta. Endangered Species Act
Authorizations, S. Rep. No. 96-151, reprinted in COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 97TH
CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 at 1391,

1397 (1982).
109. The agencies' use of "existing conservation efforts," for example, constantly
incorporates state and/or local conservation priorities as factors in listing determinations. See
Kristen Uchitel, PECE and Cooperative Conservation: Innovation or Subversion under the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 233 (2006). The fact that this
"consideration" appears in ESA section 4(b) under "basis for determinations" and not in ESA
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exert powerful influences over the conservation and restoration of atrisk taxa. State and local boundaries are, in this connection, highly
salient. For example, as the gray wolf delisting saga has
demonstrated, if taxa are going to be identified at listing using stateby-state records of historic occurrence, the Services inevitably will
confront the variation in state and local conservation policies when
and if they find their DPS(s) "recovered" to the point that a status
change is warranted. 110 In short, the Services' reasons for ignoring
subnational legal boundaries while responding to international
boundaries are either weak or, as yet, unspecified.
All of that matters because the conservation of Canada lynx is
now scaling down as FWS and the federal land management bureaus
grapple with the designation and management of the lynx's "critical
habitat.'
Delayed for years while FWS addressed its massive
critical habitat backlog, the Service eventually finalized a
determination in 2006.112 Within the "specific areas" occupied by the
lynx DPS at listing, the critical habitat designation of 2006 excluded
all but a tiny fraction of the lands within the DPS's range. 113 As
section 4(a)(l), under listing determinations "generally," has never been explained or
authoritatively interpreted by the agencies, to my knowledge.
110. See Fish and Wildlife Serv., Final Rule to Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain
Population of Gray Wolf as a Distinct Population Segment and to Revise the List of
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 74 Fed. Reg. 15,123 (Apr. 2, 2009).
111. Most recently, the agency finalized an amended critical habitat rule for the lynx which
took specific notice of new information on the likely effects of climate change upon lynx
habitat in the contiguous United States. See Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the
Contiguous United States Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 74 Fed. Reg. 8616,
8617 (Feb. 25, 2009). See infra notes 115, 121 and accompanying text.
112. See Designation of Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct
Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 71 Fed. Reg. 66,008 (Nov. 9, 2006).
113. See id.
at 66,028-31. The exclusions were justified by various forms of deference to
other land and habitat conservation arrangements, including Land and Resource Management
Plans governing National Forest System lands under the National Forest Management Act,
private landowner commitments, and state and local land use plans and restrictions. See id. at
66,030-51. A cryptic statement in connection with the economic analysis of the designation
made it unclear precisely why FWS was making the exclusions. See id.at 66,052 ("[W]e
evaluated the benefits of conservation programs, plans, and partnerships relative to the
regulatory benefits of critical habitat.... As a result, we are only finalizing critical habitat for
the lynx lands [in three national parks not governed by those other mechanisms]."). ESA
section 4(b)(2) allows that FWS "may exclude any area from critical habitat if [it] determines
that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the
critical habitat .. " 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). If FWS made its finding in the 2006 rule on the
basis of a "draft economic analysis" that was never finalized, however, it did so only impliedly
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things turned out, this action was one of many tainted by the
involvement of disgraced Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior
Laurie McDonald.ll 4 FWS reissued the finding following
McDonald's departure, greatly expanding it." 5 The revised
designation included all "areas occupied by the species that currently
contain the physical and biological features essential to the
conservation of the lynx." ' 1 6 These include areas with the presence of
snowshoe hare, denning sites (coarse woody debris or rock
formations), and/or what FWS refers to as "matrix habitats"-patchy
forests of different vegetative and geologic types. 1 7 In short, the
mixture is the measure: lynx habitat needs are a rather unpredictable
amalgam of the boreal and alpine environments in which they
evolved. 118
For many, this lynx critical habitat designation represents a
powerful lever in the struggle against cultivated forests, mining,
motorized recreation, sprawl, and other choice land uses.'9 But
notice how localized those struggles are and will remain-and how
unlikely it is that they will be resolved by the (arduous, costly,
divisive, and legally confined) act of critical habitat designation for
in the quoted statement above and almost certainly opened itself
to the charge that it obscured
the grounds of its decisions. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
114. Throughout her tenure, McDonald allegedly took dozens of questionable and/or
obviously inappropriate steps to obstruct conservation programs throughout the Department of
Interior. See U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office of Inspector General,Report of Investigation: Julie
MacDonald, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Fish, Wildlife & Parks (copy on file with author);
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Res. (2008) (statement of Robin M. Nazzarro, Director of
Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office) [hereinafter
Nazzarro Testimony].
115. See Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct
Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 74 Fed. Reg. 8616.
116. Id. at 8617. "Area of occupation" and at what historical baseline are two perennial
sources of dispute in ESA section 4 decision making. In the case of the lynx, one of the alleged
interferences by McDonald was her insistence that firm proof of occurrence be documented as
of 1995-a criterion to which many objected (within and outside FWS) because it departed
from the agency's past practices.
117. See id. at 8635-38.
118. William R. Rice, Speciation Via Habitat Specialization, 1(4) EVOL. ECOL. 301 (1987)
(sorting and discussing evidence that genotype and phenotype interact as habitat demands).
119. See, e.g., Stephen C. Trombulak & Kimberly Royar, Restoring the Wild: Species
Recovery and Reintroduction,in WILDERNESS COMES HOME: REWILDING THE NORTHEAST 157
(Christopher McGrory Klyza ed., 2001).
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the lynx. "Critical habitat designation alone . . . does not require
property owners to undertake affirmative actions to promote the
recovery of the species."'' 20 Indeed, FWS has long been convinced
that "in many instances, the benefit of critical habitat designation is
low compared to the conservation benefit that can be achieved
through conservation efforts or management plans, especially when
the likelihood of a Federal action occurring is low. 1 21 Yet, as many
times as the Service has deemed the designation of critical habitat not
worth it or not "prudent," 2 2 the courts still resist these judgments. 2 3
Lynx habitat is a paradigmatic case of the micro crosshatching the
macro in conservation politics. The more we study this particular
carnivore-and federal land managers have known for years that
more and better information about lynx ecology and behavior are
sorely needed" 24-- the more evident it becomes that a variety of forest
types can support lynx, that the lynx's populational source and sink
dynamics are complex because of the long distances it can disperse
and the cyclicality of its reproduction, and that so-called earlysuccessional habitats (forests after logging, fire, or other
disturbances) tend to advantage lynx, albeit not where later120. 74 Fed. Reg. at 8646.
121. Id. at 8646. Virtually identical conclusions about the relative benefits of critical
habitat designations appear in the revised designation for Peninsular bighorn, see Fish and
Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical
Habitat for Peninsular Bighorn Sheep and Determination of a Distinct Population Segment of
Desert Bighorn Sheep (Ovis canadensisnelsoni), 74 Fed. Reg. 17,288 (Apr. 14, 2009), and the
revised designation for the Quino checkerspot butterfly, see Fish and Wildlife Service,
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for
Quino Checkerspot Butterfly (Euphydryas editha quino), 74 Fed. Reg. 28,766, 28,806-22 (June
17, 2009).
122. ESA section 4(a)(3) states that the Services shall "to the maximum extent prudent and
determinable," designate critical habitat at the time of listing. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
123. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 444-46 (5th Cir.
2001); Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States Dep't of Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1125-27
(9th Cir. 1997); Jumping Frog Research Inst. v. Babbitt, 1999 WL 1244149 (N.D. Cal. 1999);
Conservation Council of Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1284-85 (D. Haw. 1998); Bldg.
Indus. Ass'n v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 905-06 (D.D.C. 1997).
124. Fifteen years ago, the Forest Service undertook a comprehensive review of four
"forest carnivores": the American marten, the fisher, the lynx, and the wolverine. See Rocky
Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, The Scientific Basis for Conserving Forest
Carnivores: American Marten, Fisher, Lynx, and Wolverine in the Western United States
(1994) (Technical Report RM-254). The study of lynx in that undertaking was noteworthy for
the many "research needs" that emerged from the analysis, underscoring how little the existing
scientific information aided actual lynx management. See id. at 74-94.
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successional habitats are completely absent.125 Now that the lynx
DPS is a federally protected taxon, though, how much of a federal
priority should it become? The Services' deployment of the DPS
concept has been notoriously slippery, 126 leaving us to wonder about
their priorities. Of course, biologically, natural diversity is measured
at many different levels:
[T]he causal historical process of evolution operates on
lineages. However, lineages exist at all levels of biological
organization: genes, chromosomes, organisms, kin groups,
tribes, etc., and the processes of evolution can at least
potentially [a]ffect the entities which make up lineages at all of
these levels.
Thus, any lineage is a potential unit of
127
evolution.
So should our notion of "critical habitat" or the official
designations thereof change when it is a DPS-and not a proper
"species"-at issue?

125. See Angela K. Fuller et al., Winter Habitat Selection by CanadaLynx in Maine: Prey
Abundance orAccessibility?, 71 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1980 (2007).
126. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997); Benjamin Fenton,
Home Builders v. Norton: The Role of InternationalBoundariesunder the EndangeredSpecies
Act, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 575 (2005); Katherine M. Hausrath, The Designation of "Distinct
Population Segments" under the Endangered Species Act in Light of National Association of
Homebuilders v. Norton, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 449 (2005); Kevin D. Hill, The Endangered
Species Act: What Do We Mean by Species?, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 239 (1993); David
S. Pennock & Walter M. Dimmick, Critique of the Evolutionarily Significant Unit as a
Definition for "Distinct Population Segments" under the US. Endangered Species Act, 11
CONSERV. BIO. 611 (1997); Kevin W. Grierson, Note, The Concept of Species and the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 463 (1992); Andrew E. Wetzler, Note, The Ethical
Underpinningsof the EndangeredSpecies Act, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 154-67 (1993). This
confusion stems in large part from the biological species concept itself. See Paul-Michael
Agapow et al., The Impact of Species Concept on Biodiversity Studies, 79(2) Q. REv. BIO. 161,
163 (2004) ("The BSC is simple, obvious, and ultimately flawed."). Of course, reproductively
isolated populations are intuitively specific, and the BSC is also attractive to scientists because
"proposed species boundaries are falsifiable by the natural (and substantial) production of
fertile hybrids across them." Id. at 162. But "discerning potential reproductive barriers can be
difficult, time-consuming, expensive, and fraught with error." Id. at 163. Moreover, for all the
species that do not reproduce sexually, the BSC is useless. Id. ("The BSC can illuminate only a
small fragment of the Tree of Life.").
127. Christopher D. Horvath, Discussion: Phylogenetic Species Concept: Pluralism,
Monism, and History, 12 BIO. & PHIL. 225, 229 (1997).
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While the Service's considered judgment on the overall utility of
designating critical habitat seems rooted in experience, 28 if this is as
definite and firm as it has sounded lately, it is unclear what role such
a judgment should play in guiding subordinate officials who make the
particular critical habitat findings like that in the lynx saga. The
findings that shifted in the lynx's case, it bears mentioning, were not
that a critical habitat designation could positively benefit lynx or that
the designation itself might have significant social costs. The shifts
came in the relative values assigned to those probabilities. 29 It was
the measurements that changed.
Of course, at a minimum, the revised critical habitat designationwhich voided the extensive exclusions that had been made in the first
(McDonald-tainted) designation3 ° was a highly salient social
signal. 13 1 FWS boosted the total area of designation from roughly
128. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, The Economics of EndangeredSpecies: Why Less Is More in
the Economic Analysis of CriticalHabitatDesignations,28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 129 (2004)
(tracing the evolution of the critical habitat program from a loosely structured decisional
process to one governed by a vast array of factors and sometimes conflicting legal precedents).
129. Of course, we could easily dwell on how FWS would turn so dramatically from
concluding that the benefits of exclusion outweighed those of inclusion to concluding the
precise opposite across so much territory so rapidly. After all the speculation and
recriminations, though, we are not likely to learn all that much that we did not know already.
When the stakes are high-or at least seem high-political actors at the heads of agencies will
insert themselves into otherwise routine decision-making processes, sometimes in sinister ways.
Many have argued that this is a cautionary tale about the involvement of politicians (especially
crooked politicians) in what should be a pristinely expert-even scientific-agency action. It
certainly is a cautionary tale. But none of this episode involved decisions that could ever
possibly be made solely on the basis of "scientific" information or scientific methods (which is
not to say that the latter cannot be used to improve decisions in many ways). See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl
& James Salzman, In Defense of RegulatoryPeerReview, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1 (2006).
130. When this matter is ultimately litigated, it will probably be a function of the specific
economic analysis (and the many assumptions driving it) produced by FWS's contractor,
Industrial Economics, Inc., that has dominated the parties' attention thus far. In' extensive
comments on that analysis, Defenders of Wildlife argued that, in general, it lacked any
quantification of the benefits of a critical habitat designation, noting that it "focuse[d]
exclusively on the expected costs" of the action and was, therefore, "one-sided" and
"distorting." Comments on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Revised Critical Habitat for the
Contiguous United States Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx (Lynx Canadensis),
at 2 (copy on file with author).
131. The Services are always careful to note that critical habitat designations have an
inherent "educational" value. See, e.g., 74 Reg. at 8653 ("Critical habitat designation educates
the public about the location of core lynx habitat and areas most important for the recovery of
this species.").
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1,800 to roughly 39,000 square miles across six states. 3 2 Yet the
Services envision it as more than a social signal,133 and it should be
said that the Services have encountered skepticism in court when they
have reached virtually any critical habitat judgment without record
evidence. 134 For now, though, they seem not to be budging from the
discretion
conviction that ESA section 4(b) leaves them considerable
135
mentions.
it
factors
disparate
the
all
balance
in how they
Of course, given the persistent uncertainties surrounding lynx
conservation and restoration 3 6 and the highly variable cycles of lynx
survival and prosperity, we might just as well double back to the
unadulterated normative questions themselves. What should decide
for FWS, for example, whether a critical habitat designation will
actually reduce the overall intensity of snowmobiling in backcountry
areas or will, instead, merely shift its location? 137 Such a prediction is
almost certainly socioeconomic in nature-about as far from lynx
ecology as can be. To what degree must FWS weigh the probabilities
of human behavior, technology, social norms, and/or natural selection
132. Compare 71 Fed Reg. at66,030 (table), with 74 Fed. Reg. at 8642 (table). FWS's lead
lynx biologist was interviewed in February 2009 and maintained that this was the largest
terrestrial animal critical habitat designation ever. See Susan Gallagher, Lynx Critical Habitat
Increases, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 25, 2009, at 1.
133. Cf 74 Fed. Reg. at 8634 ("Critical habitat designations identify, to the extent known
using the best scientific data available, habitat areas that provide essential life cycle needs of the
").
species ....
134. Cf Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. at 893, 906 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting
FWS finding that critical habitat designation was not "prudent" in part because designation
might enable would-be vandals to destroy designated habitat).
135. See Memorandum for the Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior, The
Secretary's Authority to Exclude Areas from a Critical Habitat Designation under Section
4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (Oct. 3, 2008) (M-37016).
136. Leonard F. Ruggiero & Kevin S. McKelvey, Toward a Defensible Lynx Conservation
Strategy: A Framework for Planning in the Face of Uncertainty, in ECOLOGY AND
CONSERVATION OF LYNX IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 8 (Leonard F. Ruggiero et al. eds., 2000).
137. Cf 74 Fed. Reg. at 8629 (responding to commenter that welfare gains from
restrictions on snowmobiling owing to CHD may well be cancelled out by welfare losses from
increased crowding among snowmobilers and that, therefore, the "analysis does not assume that
there is a net decrease in snowmobiling but a change in the distribution of [its] occurrence").
Two economists working with Defenders of Wildlife on its comments to the economic analysis
had elsewhere argued that omission of such benefit calculations "reduces the informational
value of the analysis," and thus compromises their utility. See Timm Kroeger & Frank Casey,
Economic Impacts of Designating Critical Habitat under the US. Endangered Species Act:
Case Study of the CanadaLynx (Lynx Canadensis), 11 HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WILDLIFE 437,
450 (2006).
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itself in order to take "action"? All of this data and data integration,
supposing it could be done, would establish only the relative costs
and benefits of taking an action Congress has itself strictly limited in
its legal significance. Should not the Service be constrained in what it
invests in such decisions by the benefits its actions can even possibly
generate?
And what real expertise has FWS to decide whether current land
management plans, policies, and laws are-or may end up beingbetter "conservation practices" for a listed taxon than the critical
habitat designation? The latter means the injection of a resourcestarved federal wildlife agency increasingly beset by litigation, staff
shortages, and informational scarcity, into an indefinite list of
activities involving both the taxon and the federal government. The
language of ESA section 4(b) invites the Services to make just this
kind of multi-factored judgment. 138 Yet, in reality, they must guess at
such junctures. In the original 2006 critical habitat rule, FWS
pointedly deferred to the "Lynx Conservation Assessment and
Strategy" ("LCAS"), a multi-agency management framework created
in 2000 by the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and
FWS. 139 In this LCAS, 140 several different agencies pooled their
expertise and information on lynx to establish measurable goals for
lynx habitat conservation in a wide range of federal land management
units across the West.141 Critics attacked this use of the LCAS,142 and
138. If there is any part of the ESA more deeply qualified in its commitment to
conservation by "other factors," I have never found it. ESA section 4(b)(2) states that critical
habitat shall be designated "on the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into
consideration the economic impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat. The Secretary may exclude any area
from critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of
specifying such area as part of the critical habitat ....
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
139. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 66,010.
140. See BILL RVEDIGER ET AL., U.S.D.A FOREST SERVICE, CANADA LYNx
CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter LCAS].

141. The focus in the LCAS was creating practicable measures to be incorporated into the
land management plans required of the Forest Service and BLM by the enabling legislation.
LCAS, supra note 140, at 1-4. "Irrespective of the limitations of current knowledge,
management of lynx habitat will occur on nearly 50 national forests, BLM field offices in 6
states, 7 national parks, and possibly on a few wildlife refuges ... The conservation strategy
must provide guidance that retains future options provides management consistency, offers
necessary flexibility, and conserves lynx and lynx habitat." Id. at 3.
142. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife et al., Comments on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife

HeinOnline -- 32 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 264 2010

2010]

Qualitative, Quantitative, and Integrative Conservation

265

FWS later recanted, concluding in 2009 that the LCAS, while helpful
to federal land managers, ought not to preempt the designation of
critical habitat. 43 ESA section 5 directs FWS to cooperate with the
Forest Service in acquiring land for the National Forest System to
"conserve fish, wildlife, and plants" therein, "including" those that
are listed. 144 But Congress has never seen fit to invest FWS with the
sort of human resources that would enable it to judge the efficacy of
the Forest Service's (or others') conservation practices.
Whether the lynx's current distribution and abundance in the
contiguous United States is worth the trouble FWS already has had
with this DPS or not, it seems right to conclude at least the following:
(1) even with much better information about the lynx or its ecology, a
recognizably complete risk analysis of any of the choices outlined
above would essentially be out of order so long as restorative work
would rebuild future lynx populations; 145 and (2) the multi-factored
analysis that section 4 demands in the listing and critical habitat
procedures would actually amount to comparative institutional
analysis-something well beyond the present abilities of the
Services. The most potent lesson here, however, may be one of
politics, publicity, and the shaping of public priorities. The median
legislator in Congress has very little reason to care about the lynx
saga or the forces that converged to create it. Indeed, the lynx is
arguably the most anonymous "charismatic megafauna"-and
sometime beneficiary of federal management-ever.1 46 While the
ESA has withstood attempts at its repeal, because of the annual
appropriations process (not to mention a stream of exceptions like,
Service's Revised Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct Population
Segment of the Canada Lynx (Lynx canadensis), Revised Proposed Rule. 73 Fed. Reg. 62,450
(Oct. 21, 2008), letter of Nov. 20, 2008, at 5 (on file with author).
143. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 66,020.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1534.
145. Global extinction risks, in other words, present the kind of definite outcomes that can
be matched up with alternative possible futures and compared. Declining abundance and/or
range, however, arguably lack the definition and determinate variables that make a risk analysis
productive. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
146. Cf Shannon Petersen, Congress and CharismaticMegafauna: A Legislative History of
the EndangeredSpecies Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463 (1999) (reviewing the ESA's history and innate
connection with charismatic megafauna from the Puerto Rican parrot to the black-footed ferret
without ever mentioning the lynx).
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for example, the Sikes Act147), it remains a far cry from an effective
solution to biodiversity loss. Unfortunately, boosting appropriations
will do little to address the underlying predicament (although more
money might help at the margins). As Part III argues, the demands
for information and proceduralized deliberation in conservation today
are most likely insatiable. And the more they are set and met as
parameters for federal agency action, the more vicious becomes the
circle they draw. Part III describes the imbalanced triaging system
into which the ESA has evolved.

III. DELIBERATE TRIAGE: QUANTIFYING, PRIORITIZING, AND
SIGNALING RISKS

Evidence-based conservation and standard risk analyses,
especially when decision makers must weigh and compare several
disparate choice factors, have daunting informational needs. The
further we have delved into "population viability analysis" ("PVA"),
the less certain we are that we can ever know which biological
entities merit our protection. 148 When integrated into the choice
situations that real actors like the Services face, PVA becomes a
veritable black hole for information. 149 Thus, judicial review that
identifies "rationality" with reason-giving' 50 predictably renders
agency inaction more likely even while our judiciary resists
reviewing inaction in itself.1 5' And the further we look into our future
147. Pub. L. No. 86-797, 74 Stat. 1052 (1960), codified as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a-o.
148. Many extinction probability estimates are, given the paucity of evidence one way or
the other, essentially meaningless. See, e.g., John Feiberg & Stephen P. Ellner, When Is It
Meaningful to Estimate an Extinction Probability?,81(7) ECOLOGY 2040 (2000).
149. See Martin Drechsler & Mark Burgman, Combining Population Viability Analysis
with Decision Analysis, 13 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERV. 115 (2004). Some of the cognitive
barriers are being addressed by the mainstreaming of serviceable PVA software. See Tim
Coulson et al., The Use and Abuse of Population Viability Analysis, 15(5) TRENDS ECOL. &
EVOL. 219, 220 (2001). Nothing can eliminate the need for real data, though. Id.at 220.
150. Cf 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ("The reviewing court shall .. .hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ...arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
discretion .. ");Ass'n of Data Proc. Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677,
684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Review [of agency factual findings] without an agency record ... comes
down to review of reasonableness.").
151. Cf Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60
ADMrN. L. REv. 1, 23 (2008) ("Any time a court reviews an agency decision, the court is in
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as the outlines of a (radically) disrupted global climate come into
focus, the more urgent our decisional trees seem. The recent listing of
the Polar bear as "threatened" under the ESA illustrates this trap in
Section B. Section A first considers the normative and positive senses
of information availability.
A. The StructuringInfluences of Uncertainty:Beyond "Availability"
Heuristics
The ESA famously joins its most critical required findings to the
use of the "best available" "scientific" information. 15 2 But what is the
best available scientific information'53 as a norm? Clearly, there is a
sense in which "available" in this standard is just a matter of fact: if
an agent possesses scientific data, it must be used. 54 But one evident
alternative-a normative sense in which agents must account to
someone else for their data gaps-has factored prominently in the
few judicial decisions invalidating or questioning the Services'
judgments on the availability of information. 55 And it assumes that
some way interfering with agency resource allocation, and not just where a court compels an
agency to take a particular action.").
152. See Ruhl & Salzrnan, supra note 129, at 16-19.
153. "Best available scientific information" is a phrase that appears in no fewer than a
dozen different conservation and environmental statutes-and is defined in none of them. See
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Why Better Science Isn't
Always Better Policy, 75 WASH U. L.Q. 1029, 1034 n.9 (1995).
154. As J.B. Ruhl has argued, this sense of the term renders the clause essentially
redundant in our legal system given the scope and nature of "arbitrary and capricious" review
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. See J.B. Ruhl, The Battle over Endangered
Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 582 (2004).
155. See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173,
1183-85 (D. Idaho 2007); Kern County Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1080-81 (9th
Cir. 2006); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 926 F. Supp. 920, 924-27 (D. Ariz.
1996). Economists long ago accepted that it could be entirely rational to forego collecting
information the costs of which outweighed any of its expected benefits. See, e.g., George J.
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). This corresponded
roughly with the rise of "bounded rationality" as a methodological assumption in the study of
human and organizational behavior. Most proponents of such structured search, thus, assume
that some kind of "optimal search" strategy exists, at least theoretically, for virtually any
informational demand. See Peter Morgan & Richard Manning, Optimal Search, 53
ECONOMETRICA 923 (1985). Thus, the "best available" scientific information requirements in
the ESA probably allow that some search costs will not be worth incurring. Cf SCIENCE AND
THE ESA, supra note 2, at 126-29 (arguing that estimation techniques, even techniques with
known flaws, often are clearly superior to information collection in aiding decision making).
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judging the informational insufficiencies is rightly carried out by the
56
intensely interested few who go to court and/or by the judiciary1 returning us to exactly the sort of comparative institutional
analysis
157
so few in government have any expertise in conducting.
Even putting aside search costs and the risks of indefinite
searching, 'available information' can be a notoriously corrosive
influence in both individual and collective decision making.15 8 Socalled 'availability cascades,' are proven causes of some of the most
persistent forms of irrationality and unreason: through these cascades,
a pool of agents will keep repeating a mistaken judgment from the
"available"-though perhaps radically incomplete or incorrectinformation. 5 9 Moreover, even beyond availability cascades, the
"best" available information can subtly rigidify decision makers who,
intent on assuring others that they have done their "best," grow
resistant to critique, re-analysis, and/or subsequent correction. 160 Such
indirect consequences of the ESA's underlying premises are surely
hard to quantify. And a more immediate concern may be the extent to
which this particular normative ideal has rendered ESA "actions"
sclerotic.16 1 So what ought we to expect from the Services as they
156. Cf Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1208 (D. Or. 2001) (articulating a
presumption that "best available scientific information" is used and requiring a challenging
party to rebut that presumption with more than mere allegations).
157. This perhaps explains the waning interest of some courts in "best available
information" claims generally. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Badgley, 335 F.3d
1097 (9th Cir. 2003).
158. See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 106-07 (2000).
159. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REv. 683 (1999); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990). Even worse is when an
"expert" makes such a mistake and then others lazily copy it in light of that actor's reputation.
Kuran & Sunstein, supra, at 737-38. A large, diverse population, at least, will not perceive
risks according to the same (or "correlated") biases. Finally, to a measurable extent, some
biases are exacerbated and/or trimmed by one's hard-to-alter "worldviews." See Dan M. Kahan
et al., Fearof Democracy: A CulturalEvaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1071
(2006); cf Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1099 (2003) (describing the formative influences of"worldview" in qualitative terms).
160. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 159, at 754 & n.249.
161. Litigation brought to enforce this more normative sense of "best available
information" against the Services has often been protracted, highly visible, and antagonistic.
See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Kempthome, 2008 WL 2338501 (D. Idaho 2008); Ctr.
for BiologicalDiversity v. Badgley, 335 F.3d at 1097; Western Watersheds Project v. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Idaho 2007).
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carry out the Herculean tasks required by the ESA? The "policy
scientist" suggested by Harold Lasswell and his successors 162-the
skillful professional who blended interdisciplinary science with
practical political sense-was always a vision, never a reality. 163 But
as we intuit ways to cope with the two framing assumptions laid out
above, both the direct and indirect consequences of the ESA's "best
available" information standards ought to enter the assessment.
Consider for a moment one court's recent holding that FWS had
not used the best available scientific information in reaching a "not
warranted" finding on several petitions to list the greater sage
grouse. 164 The Service had convened a panel of seven outside
scientists with relevant expertise and asked them when the sage
grouse would go extinct.1 65 Only three of those panelists seemed to
believe the grouse was likely to be extinct within a century; the other
four said it probably would take longer. 66 The Service director
ultimately concluded that listing was not warranted, in large part
because of this outcome on the panel.1 67 This actually was a rather
clever procedure: "majority voting most effectively aggregates the
information dispersed among the panel of experts. Nose counting of
162. Lasswell's ideal was recently refurbished by Professors Shapiro and Schroeder. See
Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433,437-45 (2008).
163. See James Farr et al., The Policy Scientist of Democracy: The Discipline of Harold D.
Lasswell, 100 AM. POL. SC. REV. 579 (2006). "The policy scientist of democracy... was-and
is-too demanding and contradictory a hero, aspiring to possess too much power and expertise
and to sit too closely and comfortably with those in power." Id.at 586.
164. Western WatershedsProjectv. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
165. Id. at 1180. The panel was not asked for a final written report or to respond to the
listing petitions or to make findings on any particular listing factor in ESA section 4 or on
whether to list as threatened or endangered. Id. First, the panelists each were given 100 "votes"
to allocate as between (1)extinction in 100 years, and/or (2) various intervals longer than 100
years. Each panelist was then asked to rank order the threats facing the grouse. Id.Finally, the
panelists were given the opportunity to amend their allocation of votes in light of how their
peers voted-at which point "36% of the votes cast were for extinction within 100 years"-but
sixty-four percent of the votes were cast against that outcome. Id.
166. Id. at 1180. After the panelists were briefed on existing and projected future
conservation projects for the grouse, one of the three recanted their >100 year vote. Id. A
second panel comprised of FWS managers who had observed the experts' deliberations was
then asked to evaluate how an ESA section 4 analysis ought to come out. That team also chose
100 years as the benchmark timeline and five of those seven believed that the grouse would not
go extinct in that period of time. Id. at 1181.
167. Id.
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the assembled experts is a means by which the agency can in effect
aggregate expert views, even if the agency itself lacks first-order
competence."' 168 Allowing each expert one hundred "votes" gave
them an opportunity to express their judgments probabilistically.
Unfortunately, on review, Judge Winmill found that the "best
science" was "represented by the expert panel"'' 69 and chastised the
agency for aggregating the panelists' views as it had.170 In the court's
view, because no record had been kept of the panel's deliberations,
"FWS failed to adequately preserve ... the 'best science,"' making it
impossible "to review whether the Team and the Director accurately
applied the 'best science' represented by the expert panel."' 17 1 This
was, to put it mildly, naive. There is no such thing as information
unmediated by the persons conveying it. 172 Indeed, FWS's panel was
arguably managed expertly given the possibilities of strategic
behavior, groupthink, 173 and the existence of past ESA section 4
precedents open to conflicting interpretations.174
The notion that the "best scientific data available" somehow was
repressed in the process simply because the agency did not keep a
168. Adrian Vermeule, The Parliamentof the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231, 2245 (2009).
169. Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1183
(emphasis added). This is a curious conclusion: the "best science"--or, more specifically, the
"best scientific or commercial data available"-cannot be "represented," by scientists or anyone
else. For the ultimate decision on listing belonged to the Director as the Secretary had legally
delegated that responsibility to him. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b). Of course, probing the
Director's mind was out of the question. Cf. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941)
(even where administrative proceeding is "adjudicative" in nature, the official who decides
ought never be examined on how his or her decision was made).
170. Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1183-84.
171. Id.
at1183-84.
172. Recall, moreover, that courts generally must review the record agencies generate
unless a statute requires the record take a particular form. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,
142 (1973).
173. It is entirely possible that panel members would have no incentive to vote sincerely, to
acquire information in preparation for such panels, or to express themselves candidly had FWS
changed any of the conditions under which this panel operated. See Vermeule, supra note 168,
at 2257-74. "[U]nder identifiable conditions, the accuracy of the group's median or mean
member will necessarily exceed that of its single most competent member." Id at 2259 (citing
SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS,

FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 158 (2007)).
174. In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998), the
court used the report generated by an outside expert panel-a panel of experts that had
recommended listing the taxa at issue but had not considered all of ESA section 4's listing
factors before doing so-as one of the grounds for invalidating the listing rule under challenge.
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detailed enough record of what several experts expressed is an
accusation, nothing more.175 Whatever else the domain experts who
populated this panel expressed their judgments on, they almost
certainly had no expertise in evaluating the "conservation practices"
of the affected actors. 176 Finally, recall that the Act says nothing
about how the Services ought to collect or integrate the best scientific
information "available." The
Services alone must do that on a
77
rolling-and repeat-basis. 1
B. Constructinga "ForeseeableFuture": Ursus Maritimus at Risk
The Polar bear (Ursus maritimus) has become global climate
disruption's mascot precisely because of its powerful symbolism
among those who care little about climate change. It presents to those
who care very deeply the prospect of motivating others without data
or explicit linkages of cause to effect. But what happens when the
Polar bear's persuasive powers run out? Arguments for bold action
that involve the Polar bear are, after all, enthymematic: they omit key
premises that might, when spelled out, change some minds. Of
course, one takeaway from the pitched struggle over centralized
regulatory review by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs ("OIRA") is that fear and its manipulation have become key
variables in our regulatory state. 178 People can fear the loss of Polar
175. The court had plenty of accusations, too. See Western Watersheds Project v. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1183-85, 1187-89. Unfortunately, this was another
proceeding in which Julie MacDonald played a role. Id. at 11188 ("MacDonald's principal
tactic is to steer the "best science" to a pre-ordained outcome. That may explain why so much
of the "best science" in this case was verbally communicated and never reduced to writing
.....
panel approach is, in large measure, what FWS has used in other
). The bifurcated
proceedings, though. See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 2338501,
at *5-14 (D. Idaho 2008).
176. But cf ESA § 4(b)(2)-(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)-(3).
177. "The magnitude of a perceived risk depends on how readily an individual can recall
instances of misfortune associated with that risk." Kahan et al., supra note 159, at 1085. But
domain experts are, unfortunately, just as capable of errors in risk perception as lay people. "As
is true of disagreements among members of the public generally, disagreements among risk
experts are distributed in patterns that cannot plausibly be linked either to access to information
or capacity to understand it." Id. at 1093. A wealth of research suggests that even experts are
subject to a variety of biasing influences. Id. at 1093-96, nn.68-85.
178.

Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN,

LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND

THE PRECAUTIONARY

PRINCIPLE (2005) (arguing that ordinary citizens often are induced to fear trivial risks while
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bears or pikas 179 without understanding what meaningful action
against climate change entails. But what if these fears skew the
allocation of scarce conservation resources?
In its recent listing of the Polar bear as "threatened," FWS
confronted a carnivore "believed to be completely dependent upon
Arctic sea ice for survival., 180 Arctic sea ice, of course, is in jeopardy
as summers in the Arctic grow warmer and wanner. 181 Modeling
collected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
("IPCC") suggests these trends will worsen, although substantial
variance still divides particular models. 8 1 Putting together Polar bear
ecology and (modeled) future Arctic conditions left FWS with a
dilemma: characterizing the urgency of this particular taxon's
troubles. The Act permits "threatened" designations where the taxon
is likely to become "endangered" throughout all or a significant
portion of its range within the "foreseeable future."' 183 But what is the
foreseeable future where global climatological processes are
concerned? A century? A decade?
The Polar bear listing was an exercise in default assumptions and
informational scarcity, clearly.184 It was also a signal from FWS to
the world at large. Polar bear populations are currently about as
robust as at any time on record and the determination was, therefore,
ignoring significant risks and that experts normally will process these risks more rationally),
with Kahan et al., supra note 159, at 1106-08 (arguing that risks can be misperceived just as
readily by experts and that expert dismissals of supposedly trivial risks amount to antidemocratic, illiberal advancement of "partisan visions of the ideal society").
179. Ruhl, supra note 65, at 2 ("[T]he American pika is running out of places to live, and
global climate change appears to be the primary cause of its decline.").
180. 12-Month Petition Finding and Proposed Rule to List the Polar Bear (Ursus
maritimus) as Threatened Throughout Its Range, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064, 1071 (Jan. 9, 2007) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 12-Month Petition].
181. Id. at 1071 ("Observations have shown a decline in late summer Arctic sea ice extent
of 7.7 percent per decade and in the perennial sea ice area of up to 9.8 percent per decade since
1978.").
182. Id. at 1072.
183. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(20), 1533(a), (b)(1)-(2).
184. Cf Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits
in EnvironmentalRegulation, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1409, 1421 (2008) ("[T]he burden of information
production and the burden of persuasion rest squarely on the regulatory agency, and the default
position is that there is no regulation unless and until the agency can establish, by "reasoned
elaboration" capable of withstanding judicial review, a convincing.., justification .... ").
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based on projected habitat Ioss. 85 Confident predictions of future
habitat conditions, in short, were the principal-if not necessarily the
sole-grounds for the agency's finding. Though perhaps
unprecedented, this probabilism was long overdue. Yet,
paradoxically, the complexities of global climate processes actually
186
make the long run more predictable than the short run on this point.
So why would the Service interpret the Act's foreseeability notion as
a function of the Polar bear's generations? Was it because the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature ("IUCN") had
interpreted its forecasting role that way in keeping its so-called "Red
List"?187 With projected ice-free summers by about 2040, the Arctic
is now expected to become much less advantageous for Polar bears in
about three generationsI 88 --exactly the benchmark IUCN uses for its
"vulnerable" status designations. 189 Indeed, the Department of the
Interior later stated that default time periods are of little-to-no-value
in constructing a "foreseeable" futurel 9°-that foreseeability is
185. See 12-Month Petition, supra note 180, at 1081 (positive finding on Factor A); id. at
1085 (negative finding for Factor B); id. at 1086 (negative finding for Factor C) id. at 1091
(negative finding for Factor D); id. at 1094 (negative finding for Factor E). The Service did note
that future stresses from contaminants (Factor E), over-harvestation, and/or site-specific
disturbances (Factor D) could interact with the projected future habitat losses to augment the
threats to Polar bears at a population level. Id. at 1095.
186.

See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:

THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 594-645 (2007) (evaluating available models and concluding
that variability increases as particular locations and time frames become the focus).
187. IUCN's Species Survival Commission and its Polar Bear Study Group updated their
assessment in 2006, reclassifying the Polar bear as "vulnerable." 12-Month Petition, supra note
180, at 1081. IUCN Red List guidelines allow generations to be calculated in a number of ways,
but the most common is as the age of sexual maturity plus fifty percent of the lifetime
reproductive period and that vulnerability in the foreseeable future means three generations or
less. See STANDARDS AND PETITIONS WORKING GROUP, UCN SSC BIODIVERSITY
ASSESSMENTS SUB-COMMITTEE, GUIDELINES FOR USING THE IUCN RED LIST CATEGORIES
AND CRITERIA 22-23 (Version 7.0, 2008) [hereinafter IUCN REDLIST GUIDELINES] (on file
with author); 12-Month Petition, supra note 180, at 170-71. That put the Polar bear's
generation at fifteen years and the Service found that IUCN's use of three generations as a
baseline in its threat assessments was "reasonable." Id. at 1070.
188. Id. at 1080-81.
189. See IUCN REDLIST GUIDELINES, supra note 187, at 13.
190. These conclusions contrast with the judge's notions of foreseeability in the sage
grouse case. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the IUCN's Red
List Guidelines stipulate that, in assessing vulnerability, either a set period of years or certain
set generational increments should be used, whichever is longer. 1UCN REDLIST GUIDELINES,
supra note 187, at 56-57.
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necessarily a matter of threats and populations and that "reliable
predictions with respect to multiple trends and threats over different
periods of time" depend upon careful "synthesis."' 9' What it has
never done is explain the role that such policy judgments play in
Service deliberations/actions more generally.
After all, what made FWS's signal so significant was not its
ultimate conclusion: there is widespread agreement that Polar bears
face a real risk of extinction.' 92 It was methodologically significant in
that it took up so much data from so many different domain
experts, 93 assigned a high significance to the probable loss of Arctic
sea ice, 194 and yet still purported to produce a wholly factual
conclusion: a "danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range" "within the foreseeable future.' ' 195 It was
significant, that is, because of how separate its assessment of the
bear's "conservation status" was made to seem from that of its
191. The Meaning of "ForeseeableFuture" in Section 3(20) of the Endangered Species
Act, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Op. Off. Solicitor M-37021, 13 (Jan. 16, 2009).
192. See 12-Month Petition, supra note 180, at 1081. Moreover, contrary to implications in
some critiques of the Polar bear decision, see, e.g., J. Scott Armstrong et al., Polar Bear
PopulationForecasts:A Public-PolicyForecastingAudit, 38(5) INTERFACES 382, 389 (2008),
FWS used the best scientific information currently available in responding to the listing
petitions-just as the statute required. While the "forecasts" FWS was forced to make involved
several key "assumptions," relied heavily on the still-primitive "general circulation models"
available in 2007, and arguably strayed from certain forecasting protocols championed by
Armstrong and his colleagues, see id at 383-89, it is pure fantasy to suggest that changes along
any of these lines would have rendered the listing proceeding more "scientific." But cf J. Scott
Armstrong et al., What is the Appropriate Public-Policy Response to Uncertainty?, 38(5)
INTERFACES 404, 405 (2008) (suggesting that FWS did not follow "scientific procedures" in its
Polar bear listing proceeding). As Amstrup and colleagues argued in response, GCM's and
basic knowledge of the physics of the Earth's solar energy balancing make it a virtual certainty
that warming will continue as greenhouse gas concentrations rise and that ice-free summers in
the Arctic will eventually occur-and that that certainty only increases the further into the
future the projections stretch. Steven C. Amstrup et al., Rebuttal of "PolarBear Population
Forecasts: A Public-Policy Forecasting Audit," 39(4) INTERFACES 353, 355-57 (2009). In
other words, the immediacy of thawing in the Arctic may be open to reasonable doubt without
the probability of thawing being so.
193. See 12-Month Petition, supra note 180, at 1065 (a panel of twelve outside experts and
ten "peer reviewers" used in Status Assessment).
194. The USGS scientists whose work on the Polar bear supported FWS's listing
determination have said that this probability was unequivocally the most powerful influence in
their estimates. See Amstrup et al., supra note 192, at 9-11.
195. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20) (2000).
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"conservation priority."' 9 6 These two are perhaps epistemically
different things--one of them positive, the other normative. Yet,
while they may present distinct kinds of choices, they are tightly
coupled as a practical matter. For example, a taxon's chances for
survival influence the priority any particular actor assigns its
conservation.' 97 Before we respond that "status" assessments should
always precede "prioritization" in conservation, recall the
informational barriers involved and the need for at least some
prioritizations in order to rank all of the candidates for assessment. 98
Let us consider the Polar bear as a global conservation priority.
Assigning it a high priority is at least counterintuitive next to
quantitative metrics like richness-to-cost ratios 99 and what it
probably will take to arrest the trends in Arctic sea ice. Yet the Polar
bear dominated conservation politics for years, literally embodying
the implausibility of separating what we know--or think we knowfrom our priorities. Moreover, given the structure of ESA section
4,200 to say nothing of FWS's own quite jaundiced listing priority

196. This was important because confusion of conservation status with conservation
priority is a common error globally. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Miller et al., National Threatened
Species Listing Based on IUCN Criteriaand Regional Guidelines: Current Status and Future
Perspectives, 21(3) CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 684, 689 (2007). Maintaining the distinction in
the Polar bear's case is doubly significant given how comparatively few species are at risk
exactly because of the Arctic's loss of sea ice and how extensive will be the measurable human
consequences of reversing the causal influences behind that particular environmental
disturbance. Judging from the specific rulemakings that followed-including the special rule
under ESA section 4(d) and the changes to ESA section 7 consultation procedures (later
rescinded)-the Service's "status" assessment was intimately bound up with its "priority"
assessment as a practical matter.
197. Cf THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV 25 (Richard Flathman ed., 1997) (1651)
("[T]o promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no Covenant."); IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A548 (N.K. Smith trans., 1929) (1787) ("The action to which the
'ought' applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions."); Ruhl, supra note 179, at 61
("The agency's objective should be to avoid accelerating the decline of species who stand no
chance of surviving climate change, but not to take measures on their behalf which could pose
threats to other species.").
198. See supranotes 45, 149 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Andrew Balmford et al., Integrating Costs of Conservation into
InternationalPriority Setting, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 597, 599 (2000); Brooks et al.,
supra note 75, at 60-6 1.
200. The Act requires the Services to hear and decide petitions roughly as they are filed.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833, 837-40 (9th
Cir. 2001).
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"guidelines,, 02 ' FWS was always facing severe constraints in how it
responded to the Polar bear petition and justified its actions. As a
"signal," the Polar bear's listing status today begs the question of
how we are responding to conservation's real challenges.
To put the point more clinically, priority-setting and information
availability are inescapably agent-centered. A somewhat clunky-but
accurate--depiction of this nexus is that assessments of conservation
status and priority are neither exogenous nor endogenous to one
another
because,
while
they should
be epistemically
distinguishable,20 2 each is vital to the other if they are to do real work
as reasons for action. Now FWS only had reason to list and to act to
"conserve" the Polar bear by virtue of its legal obligations under the
ESA 20 3 and its findings and conclusions about the bear's probable
future. The balance of its reasons, in other words, stemmed from the
norms imposed upon it, its own internal norms, and its "available"
information.20 4 In a real sense, that is, the Services' duties often are
201. See Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 48
Fed. Reg. 43,098 (Sept. 21, 1983). In substance, the listing priority guidelines preference taxa
that are (1) the most "genetically distinct" from their evolutionary neighbors; (2) facing
comparatively "imminent" threats; and (3) likely to benefit from conservation actions. Id. at
43103-05. But the Service recognized that assessing these factors was likely to become
somewhat paradoxical in practice. Cf id. at 43099 ("[T]he setting of listing priorities is an
intermittent, rather than continuous, activity, and . . . information developed on a species
believed to have a high priority may indicate that a lower priority is justified, but . . . this
situation would not necessarily preclude its being listed while the status information was
available and current.").
202. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy,
86 TEx. L. REV. 1601, 1620-29 (2008).
203. As already mentioned, the Services have been fortifying and rearranging those
obligations for decades with their steady stream of rules, regulations, policies, plans, and
guidelines. See supranote 43 and accompanying text. FWS's listing priorities could easily have
included consideration of the information costs entailed in listing a taxon. Cf Fish and Wildlife
Service, Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guideline Notice,
48 Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,100 (Sept. 1, 1983) (describing comments from Environmental
Defense Fund cautioning against the over-analysis of listing decisions). But see id. at 43,103-04
(explaining FWS's three "criteria" in its listing priority matrix: immediacy of threat, magnitude
of threat, and the degree of the taxon's genetic isolation, establishing twelve priority
categories).
204. In the petition process, the Services must evaluate the merits of petitions based solely
on the information presented in the petition. See, e.g., Colo. River Cutthroat Trout v.
Kempthome, 448 F. Supp. 2d 170, 176 (D.D.C. 2006). As for intent, petitioners likely did not
expect the Services to weaken the consultation rules or to issue the special ESA section 4(d)
rule. They probably rather saw the Polar bear as a public relations campaign. See, e.g., E.B.
Boyd, Kassie Siegel '95 Promotes the "Bear" Necessities, WM. & MARY MAG., Summer 2009,
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the products of their own deliberation combined with that of others
who purposefully deprive them of the discretion they would
otherwise need to engage in uninhibited reason balancing. This is
perhaps as it should be in a democratic constitutional order, 20 5 but it
is also a reminder that the Services' actions hardly ever are
straightforwardly probabilistic.20 6
More significantly, then, notice how FWS's finding on Polar bears
confirmed the relevance of IUCN's work to its own section 4 status
assessments-signaling the informational influence of that alreadyexpansive network on its practices. 0 7 Given the extraordinary
potential scope of this cooperation going forward, this aspect of the
Polar bear proceeding may prove the most productive. If ESA
practice has shown us anything, it is that combining the Services'
deliberations with that of the actors around them is growing
increasingly difficult, especially as reviewing courts impose their
own normative preconceptions of deliberation 20 8 and as the Services
order their own ranks with increasingly cryptic instruments of law,
policy, and planning.20 9 In short, with the costs of deliberation rising,
public investments in conservation falling, and the challenges
expanding, the practice of endangered species protection may be its
own undoing unless and until its agents find better, more efficient
ways of partnering and collaborating. Part IV makes the case for
shifting the Services' attention considerably as they confront
at 26 (explaining that Siegel and Cummings, lawyers for the Center for Biological Diversity,
have long viewed the Polar bear as the ideal public relations tool). They perhaps even intended

to spur congressional action on climate change. See id. But this is clearly the confusion of
means and ends that has become so characteristic of the hyper-strategic environment in which
ESA practice occurs today.
205. See supranote 36.
206. Cf Leona K. Svancara et al., Policy-Driven Versus Evidence-based Conservation:A
Review of Political Targets and Biological Needs, 55 BIOSCIENCE 989, 990-94 (2005)

(contrasting evidence-based measurable goals and politically oriented measurable goals and
concluding that the latter have almost always been unrelated to what biology or ecology reveal

about species' needs).
207. The public announcement of this cooperation perhaps alleviated some transparency
concerns that may have otherwise arisen, see, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17-21 (2005), although it did
nothing to mitigate the potential reputational cascades or other cognitive biases that networks of
this kind often exacerbate. See Kahan et al., supra note 159.
208. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
209. See supranotes 40-59 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 32 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 277 2010

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 32:237

"conservation practices" all around them without the resources one
would need properly to improve them.
IV. MEASURING WITHOUT MANAGING?: COGNITIVE UNBUNDLING IN
A NETWORKED WORLD

A variety of mishaps in quantitation have garnered close attention
in risk regulation lately, 210 reminding us of how badly astray even
well-intentioned exercises in quantification can go. 21' To attack the
use of quantitative methods root and branch by pointing to the
mistakes they have generated is itself irrational, though.212 Mistakes
are a constant throughout all of practical reason, and refusing to
measure simply because of the risk of error is a good heuristic in very
few settings. Risk regulation is about imagining possible futures and
bringing about the desired futures we can both envision and
collectively effectuate knowing what little we do about causes and
effects.2 13 And to posit a quantified present probability of the threats
to an organism, population, species, species-assemblage, or
210. The "excesses" of quantitation would include, in the views of many, the use of
monetary values to score risk reducing actions, the use of discount rates to scale future
benefits/costs back to present value, and a host of other quantitative methods having either
minor or serious shortcomings in and of themselves. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 1; ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supranote 8.
211. As Professor Kysar has argued, "the formal language of the cost-benefit framework is
not only irreducibly incomplete; it also is capable of denying its own incompleteness." Douglas
A. Kysar, Discounting... On Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 138 (2007). Unfortunately, though,
qualitative reasoning purged of numeric estimation is just as "incomplete," if not more so.
212. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEw FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 1-2 (2006); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND
OUR HEALTH (2008). Indeed, virtually any quantitative technique can, given the right time and
place, serve as a useful tool to policymakers. See, e.g., Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002) (reviewing the various
methods and justifications for time discounting).
213. As Professor Dan Esty put it:
Uncertainty seems to be the hallmark of the environmental domain. Disagreements
over how best to cope with information deficits have translated into bitterly partisan
and divisive environmental politics and limited progress in recent years in pollution
control and natural resource stewardship. Perhaps this picture represents the
inescapable reality of the environmental realm.
Daniel C. Esty, EnvironmentalProtection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 118

(2005).
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ecosystem, is merely to continue our "Enlightenment" so often traced
to Newton, Leibniz, Hume, Bayes, and their successors.2 14 But
modem conservation--compounding multiple probabilities estimated
from disparate epistemic domains-requires many minds working in
concert. That inevitably injects the imprecision of communication
and the hazards of strategic, lazy, and/or biased decision making, all
while attracting attention as a uniquely normative social event.
Discouragingly, the more this form of collective action is patterned to
our legal system as it is, the less ably it seems to approximate simple
rationality.
Of course this is not an interpretive argument. The ESA itself
obviously assumes a healthy measure of risk assessment
(conservation "status") and risk management (prioritization and
implementation) by its agents.2 15 The private sector, too, has begun
separating these two broad kinds of work.216 When we confront
defined probabilities, we have long supposed that the right response
is to multiply whatever harm or benefit is at issue by that probability
to derive a kind of "discounted" factor and even to do so
continuously as events unfold and information changes. 217 That,
214. Compare COLIN HOwSON, HUME'S PROBLEM: INDUCTION AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF
BELIEF 168-220 (2000) (interpreting Hume's discussions of causality and probability
throughout the Treatise and the Enquiry as a precursor to Bayes's concept of probability which
collapsed it into partial beliefs subject to rationality constraints), with Michael E. Gilpin &
Michael E. Soul6, Minimum Viable Populations: Processes of Species Extinction, in
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF SCARCITY AND DIVERSITY 19 (Michael E. Soul6
ed., 1986) (proposing a mode of analysis, later known as population viability analysis, that
seeks to isolate stochastic and deterministic influences relative to each other in order to enable
quantitative measurement of the threats to survival). See also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 334 (1740) (Dover 2003) (setting out Hume's famous dictum that "is" and
"ought" require different forms of reasoning).
215. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds, and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of
EnvironmentalLaw, 63 MISS. L.J. 403 (1994).
216. See, e.g., CRAIG R. GROVES, DRAFTING A CONSERVATION BLUEPRINT (2003)
(outlining an evidence-based approach to conservation planning by The Nature Conservancy or
other resource acquisition firms).
217. See John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs, in RISK
VERSUS RISK, supra note 7, at 1. The cognitive capacity to execute such successive
comparisons is another matter entirely. See id. On that more adaptive, "Bayesian" approach to,
for example, population viability analysis, see Bruce G. Marcot et al., Using Bayesian Belief
Networks to Evaluate Fish and Wildlife Population Viability under Land Management
Alternatives from an Environmental Impact Statement, 153 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 29
(2001).
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however, demands continuous refinement of probabilities and fairly
precise accounts of the relevance of consequences.218 Given the pace
of conservation practice, those conditions alone are enough for
misgivings about ambitious quantification. Moreover, an added
difficulty comes when internally plural actors-such as the
Services-must aggregate dispersed information and then
collectively weigh their choice factors. Because risks are unevenly
distributed and the disparities of exposure are widely perceived, highprofile deliberations of the kind (like ESA section 4 status changes)
become an opportunity to revisit society's deepest fissures. So what is
to be done? Part IV argues that unbundling and better distributing
conservation's tasks may well be our best hope for developing
institutions with true comparative advantages.
A. ConservationAssessment in a Hostile World
The Services face two daunting challenges framed by the ESA in
its current form. First, they need to better adapt institutionally to the
constant advances of probabilistic reasoning across a wide variety of
relevant domains. Biology today is on the brink of giant leaps
forward as we work to create the digital architecture empowering
thousands (if not millions) of collaborators to pool and integrate their
own bits of observational data. 219 To look at them, the Services
seemed poised to play essentially no role in that endeavor. ESA
section 4 is just one example of a statute requiring the Services to
solve for an array of complex, multivariate equations and to give
reasons for whatever judgments they reach. And, given the chances
that these reasons will be rejected in any given action, it 22is0
unsurprising that they have learned how to announce and defend,

218. Establishing the (social) relevance of consequences in conservation is fraught with
difficulty given the pervasive moral and political disagreements over what Kenneth Goodpaster
called "moral considerability." See Kenneth Goodpaster, On Being Morally Considerable,75 J.
PHIL. 308 (1978). With deep disagreement over the relevance of consequences, investments in
quantification often are moot. See generally Kai M Chan et al., When Agendas Collide: Human
Welfare andBiological Conservation,21 CONSERV. BIO. 59 (2007).
219. See Steve Kelling et al., Data-Intensive Science: A New Paradigmfor Biodiversity

Studies, 59 BIoSCIENCE 613 (2009).
220. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?: Lessons from a Study in
MaladaptiveManagement, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 293, 308-23 (2007).
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to dissemble when new data question their conclusions, 22 and to
minimize exposing their overall insufficiency for the jobs Congress
handed them.222
The obvious upshot of being organized for multiple roles is that
the Services cannot optimize for any single role. And that means that,
223
generally speaking, resources are a chief constraint. 22
Ideally, the
Services would have the expertise to provide needed coordination to
the research currently being done on demography, dispersal,
colonization, migration, habitat disruption, and speciation.2 24 But they
are incapable of doing so today and, indeed, too often are unaware
such research is even being conducted. 2 5 In short, the Services have
a lot of improving to do as networks.
Secondly, and relatedly, they must better structure themselves to
fit a fiscal environment and a political world full of existing
''conservation practices" that are both hostile to top-down
prescriptions of how properly to value nature. Jurisdictional plurality
and the conditions it sets for democracy are genetically encoded in
America and, by extension, in its conservation statutes. Our vertical
and horizontal divisions of authority are more standard than ever
today, even as our culture, economy, and communities scale upward
and outward.226 And handing a society's richest, most challenging
221. See, e.g., Philip Kline, Grizzly Bear Blues: A Case Study of the EndangeredSpecies
Act's Delisting Processand Recovery Plan Requirements, 31 ENVTL. L. 371 (2001) (detailing
the selectivity of data uptake in the recovery planning for Grizzly bears).
222. See Jamison E. Colbum, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L.
REv. 417 (2005).
223. It is even possible to model the effects of "enactments costs"-the procedural and
other investments agencies must make in their policymaking actions-on an agency's
incentives to invest in acquiring expertise. See Matthew C. Stephenson, BureaucraticDecision
Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469 (2007).
224. See JAMES H. BROWN, MACROECOLOGY 230-35 (1995).
225. The accounts are too numerous to cite detailing the lack of scientific awareness--or
blatant disregard of scientific data-at some decisional juncture within one of the Services. See,
e.g., Liza Gross, Why Not the Best?: How Science Failedthe FloridaPanther,3(9) PLOS Bio.
1525 (2005) (detailing the ignorance and suppression of scientific data indicating demographic
crises as a result of habitat loss in the remaining Florida panthers of southwestem Florida).
Even if total awareness of the natural sciences were possible, the Services would still need to
acquire a far better understanding of human behavior, as well. Cf Chan et al., supra note 218, at
65 ("Conservation biologists must also become more adept at bridging disciplinary divides and
consulting the social science literature for insights about how to design culturally, politically,
and socioeconomically appropriate conservation plans.").
226. This is our constitutionalism's paradox in a cosmopolitan world, though, not
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questions about its relationship to nature to two smallish agencies
with sub-cabinet-level leadership and politically vulnerable budgets
is an odd way of prioritizing biodiversity. The Services need political
leaders capable of reworking their organizations at a structural level.
Organizational psychology has long distinguished between
"disjunctive" tasks, in which only one person needs to succeed for the
group to be successful, and "conjunctive" tasks in which each
person's contribution is critical to success.22 7 The ESA saddles the
Services with far too many conjunctive tasks today, inviting their
opponents to disrupt, delay, and defeat them 228 and leaving them
prone to side-tracking.2 29 From "candidate" status to designated
critical habitat for the Canada lynx contiguous-U.S. DPS took over
twenty years-and is probably still not settled.23 ° If things were
measurably improved for the lynx in that period, it was not due to
FWS's swift actions on its behalf.
It is often said that novices count in fives or tens while experts
count in sixteenths. But this is half right at best. Most experts know
conservation's. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 10 (2009) ("Federalism is often linked with localism,
with respect and affection for local institutions and local culture. Federalism generally exists in
opposition to nationalism. The nationalizing trends in the United States, though, seem to be
increasing."); cf. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR
THE MODERN STATE 47 (2005) ("The reified, nonheuristic character of the three-branch
metaphor produces fruit of [an] . . . addictive nature. As a general matter, it induces us to
underemphasize the administrative character of our government and overemphasize the value of
political and judicial controls.").
227. See, e.g., Ivan D. Steiner, Models for Inferring Relationships between Group Size and
PotentialGroup Productivity, H (4) BEHAV. SCI. 273 (1966).
228. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
229. See Wyman, supranote 45; Sinden, supra note 128;
230. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Kempthorne, No. 04-1230 (GK) 2006 WL 2844232
(D.D.C. 2006), the district court heard arguments on whether FWS had properly answered all of
the court's questions about its findings and conclusions when listing the lynx as "threatened"
(and not "endangered") in 2001. Id. at *9-13. Judge Kessler found that FWS had not fully
answered why the loss of lynx range and abundance in the contiguous United States was not
sufficient to list it as endangered under ESA section 4 and remanded the matter to FWS for a
better explanation-which she "hope[d] that FWS [could] accomplish... within 90 days." Id.
at *13. FWS obliged and "clarified" its conclusions on the lynx's status, see Clarification of
Significant Portion of the Range for the Contiguous United States Distinct Population Segment
of the Canada Lynx, 72 Fed. Reg. 1186 (Jan. 10, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), but
later noticed yet another status review involving further geographic coverage for the DPS. See
90-Day Finding on a Petition to Change the Listing Status of the Canada Lynx, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,990 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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that cognitive shortcutting is indispensable in practice. Take the
Services' "warranted-but-precluded" findings and the paradoxical
"candidate" statuses they now bestow. 231 These are necessarily
relative prioritizations based on qualitative judgments like the
supposed "magnitude" of known threats to a certain taxa.232 Because
of the forces bearing down on them, though, the Services must
literally over-parameterize these assessments in order to give
plausible reasons for their actions-reasons that obscure deeply
normative judgments of scale, value, and intuitive risk assessment.233
Instead of conducting these analyses systematically, the Services
camouflage them and obscure the fact that they generate irreducibly
qualitative judgments. "Well-designed risk-assessment processes
create products that serve the needs of a community of consumers,
including risk-managers, community and industrial stakeholders, risk
assessors themselves, and ultimately the public. ' 234 If ESA section 4
could be that dialectical, the Services seem not to have noticed.235
Try as we have, and no matter how often we are reminded that
personifying agents of the state comes at great cost, 2 36 we still
misperceive entities like the Services as "persons' ' 237 instead of
231. See supranotes 66-72, 79 and accompanying text.
232. See Listing Priority Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,103 (Sept. 21, 1983).
233. The list of precedents demanding better, clearer "reasons" for warranted-butprecluded findings is long and growing. See, e.g., Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp. at 1388; Carlton v. Babbitt, 900 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1995).
The Ninth Circuit, in particular, has taken to this game, demanding that clear "reasons" for
a warranted-but-precluded finding be published concurrent with the "finding." See, e.g., Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2001); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Kempthome, 466 F.3d 1098, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). That court seems oblivious to the resourceconstrained context of this struggle, though.
234. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 65.
235. Instead, we have shifting and inconsistent applications of (vague) concepts like
"distinct population segments," see supranote 97 and accompanying text, incomplete economic
analyses of the practical value of critical habitat designations, see supra notes 113, 130 and
accompanying text, and cryptic legal norms like the Listing Priority Guidelines. See supra notes
87, 201, 203, 232 and accompanying text.
236.

See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

180 (1979) ("States are not sources of ends in the same sense as are persons. Instead, states are
systems of shared practices and institutions within which communities of persons establish and
advance their ends."). See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Governments Pay: Markets,
Politics,and the Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
237. Cf. HOBBES, supra note 197 (conceiving of the "state" as a legal person named
"Leviathan").
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viewing them as the networks of interconnected agents and teams
they truly are.238 If decision costs are depleting the Services as actors,
maybe they should simplify or shed some of those decisions. In other
words, given that priority-setting and information availability are
agent-centered, perhaps the wisest reform is to unbundle these steps
as conservation tasks, distribute them to different agents, and monitor
the way in which partnerships form. As Georgina Mace has argued,
there are two fundamentally different kinds of actions conservation
requires:
On the one hand species are units for listing whereas on the
other they are the identifiable targets for conservation actions
on the ground. Both of these activities require that there is a
valid and documented name, against which candidates for
listing, protection and management can be tested....
However, listing on the one hand, and designing and
implementing practical conservation actions in situ on the
other, are very different processes. . . . [T]hese two kinds of
major conservation activity . . . have different purposes,
constraints, and requirements.
As our rehearsals of the Canada lynx and Polar bear sagas
underscored, establishing and describing relevant biological entities
and the threats they face is its own struggle, rendered more
treacherous by the vagaries of the biological species concept
("BSC"). 240 Without a stable identity, it is impossible to say what is at
risk, and the truth is that, too often, biology raises more questions
than it answers about natural kinds. 241 The actual expression of those
238. See RUBIN, supra note 226, at 53 ("The network metaphor provides an alternative
image of government to the.., image of three separate branches.").
239. Georgina M. Mace, The Role of Taxonomy in Species Conservation, 359 PHIL. TRANS.
R. Soc. LOND. 711,713 (2004).
240. See Fuller, supra note 125; see also Agapow et al., supra note 126, at 163 ("BSC can
illuminate only a small fragment of the Tree of Life.").
241. Cf Brent D. Mishler & Robert N. Brandon, Individuality, Pluralism, and the
Phylogenetic Species Concept, 2 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 397, 398 (1987) ("[N]either species nor
other biological taxa can productively be viewed as sets or classes defined by possession of
certain features."); see also T.E. Wilkerson, Species, Essences and the Names of NaturalKinds,
43 PHIL. Q. 1, 3 (1993) ("We confidently apply the word 'tiger', literally or metaphorically
pointing to certain typical tigers, but may not have the faintest idea what actually determines
membership of the kind."); Michael Donoghue, A Critique of the Biological Species Concept
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kinds genetically, spatially, morphologically, and ecologically, is
precisely what commends the decentralization and distribution of our
BSC, in short, is probably coming
decision making. 242 The top-down
243
life.
useful
its
of
end
the
to
Yet the actions that aim to protect habitat and reproduction in situ
are equally complicated and no less cognitively demanding. Will the
critical habitat designation measurably improve the Canada lynx's
chances in the contiguous United States? 244 On the evidence, it is
essentially a coin flip. 245 There certainly is a substantial federal role
and Recommendationsfor a PhylogeneticAlternative, 88(3) THE BRYOLOGIST 172, 173 (1985)
("The biological species concept rests on the idea that interbreeding... is of prime importance
in evolution, i.e., breeding determines whether morphological or ecological divergence can
occur. This theory now appears grossly oversimplified and, as a result, so does the biological
species concept.").
242. Shifting across these dimensions of natural kinds shifts conservation's spatial and
temporal scales and can therefore shift its political salience, perhaps in counter-intuitively
productive ways. Cf Chrisoula Andreou, Environmental Preservation and Second-Order
Procrastination,35(3) PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 233 (2007) (arguing that persistent procrastination on
conservation measures is not necessarily tantamount to hypocrisy and that some preferences are
just not normally expressed until the prospect of looming losses). "When there is nothing I need
to do immediately but plenty I need to do at some point, I often break out of my list of things to
do and start in right away on those tasks that I can clearly see my way to accomplishing." Id. at
248.
But note that experts contributing to one of the Services' section 4 status assessments are
increasingly likely to be aware of the consequences that can flow from their choices and,
therefore, that the continued lockstep linkage of risk assessment and risk management under the
ESA will not necessarily optimize "available" information. Experts, in particular, seem given to
masking disagreements they cannot explain to non-experts. So, for example:
[j]oint acceptance of a position is consistent with considerable disagreement among
group members, and with considerable abstention as well. I may agree to let p stand as
my group's position, even though I myself reject it and accept q instead.... Given the
meaning of joint acceptance, and the obligations incurred in an act of joint of
acceptance, this form of agreement can clearly lead to the withholding of information
about the state of knowledge, and especially t he extent of disagreement within a
group.
John Beatty, Masking Disagreementamong Experts, 52 EPISTEME 53 (2006). Finally, given the
pervasive human tendency to discount future consequences, dampening information flows in
this way can make centralization into a recipe for inaction. Andreou, supra, at 245-48.
243. This is not to say that a reauthorized ESA would omit the species concept. Various
bottom-up successors to the BSC, some quite powerful, have been in development for years.
See Agapow et al., supra note 126, at 163.
244. See supranotes 44, 128, 132 and accompanying text.
245. Many types of evidence have, of course, been brought to bear on this and similar
questions of habitat protection. See, e.g., Amara Brook et al., Landowners' Responses to an
Endangered Species Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17
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in protecting habitat, as I have argued elsewhere. But decoupling the
different aspects of that role and distributing the pieces might allow
the Services, for example, to develop exactly the kind of comparative
institutional analyses needed for the choices ESA section 4(b)(3)
prefigures.246 Furthermore, better distribution could reduce the
"uncertainty absorption" for which complex organizations are
notorious, 247 bring greater cognitive diversity to bear in assessing the
248
risks to nature's vast composition and complex functionality,
and-given our fragmentary jurisdictions-increase the opportunities
to address those risks at a variety of spatial and temporal scales.249
Thus, as presently constituted, the Services would perhaps do best
to focus their energies on the "status assessments" from which
modern, evidence-based conservation begins.25 ° Marrying all of the
uncertainties and conflicts that in situ conservation actions entail to
the risk assessments that are already complicated by our biological
sciences is almost certainly asking one agent to do too much. 25 1 It
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (2003); Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat
Destruction under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003).
246. Professor Sinden argues that courts ought to expect less from the Services in these
decisions, as if insistent litigants threatened by critical habitat designations will not simply shift
their focus to some other (analytical) shortfall(s). See Sinden, supra note 128, at 161-83. More
importantly, though, a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis of critical habitat designations as
practical, in situ conservation measures might actually empower others to take cost-effective
actions in service of the taxon's habitat needs and perhaps even to coordinate those actions at
broader scales.
247. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (4th ed. 1997).
248. Cf Kahan et al., supra note 159, at 1083-88 (collecting evidence suggesting that
cognitive diversity ameliorates biases that often diminish the collective decision-making
capacities of homogenous groups).
249. On the urgent need for this kind of diversification, see William W. Buzbee,
Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1
(2003); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public Policy Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001).
250. Cf SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 48 (critiquing EPA "risk assessment"
and "risk management" practices by observing that different kinds of professionals comprise
the work teams doing one or the other and observing that risk assessors and risk managers have
different roles).
251.

Cf SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 222-24.

[T]o ensure that risk assessments are maximally useful for risk-management
decisions, the questions that risk assessments need to address must be raised before
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compounds the practical problems of taxonomy with those of
axiology-the study of quality and value-to create a cognitively
gargantuan decision point. Combined, these two are making
evidence-based conservation under the ESA incorrigibly complex
and submerging it in an ocean of epistemic and normative conflict.
The most plausible solution, in short, is to better distribute the tasks
to prevent any one of them from dragging down the whole vessel.
B. Integrative Conservation: Qualitativeand Quantitativeby Design
Nature's composition and function are both vital and are both
arguably in jeopardy.2 52 Focusing on one to the other's exclusion has
always been a questionable interpretation of the ESA, to say nothing
of our common purposes. But it has been over twenty years since
Agee and Johnson's pioneering work emphasizing the sort of
omniscient "ecosystem management"2 53 that the prophylactic
guarding of both composition and function would entail. As we form
our priorities, ESA section 4 status changes stand out for the
unavoidably value-driven choices they entail. They showcase the
importance of resource constraints and just how profoundly such
choices are affected by the perspectives from which we approach
them. "Ask a hundred people to view a forest that has recently
experienced a hurricane or crown fire, and few would say they are
looking at a healthy ecosystem. From the perspective of a
risk assessment is conducted and may need to be different from the questions that risk
assessors have traditionally been tasked with answering.

[R]isk assessment is of little usefulness, and can even waste resources, if it is not
oriented to help discriminate among risk-management options that have to be informed
by risk (and often nonrisk) considerations.

Id.
252. See J. Baird Callicott et al., Current Normative Concepts in Conservation, 13
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 22 (1998) (exploring the distinction between compositionalism and
functionalism). Current extinction rates are thought to be three or four orders of magnitude
greater than the norm (judging by the fossil record), imperiling both composition and function.
See Stuart L. Pimm et al., The Futureof Biodiversity, 269 SCIENCE 347, 347 (1995).
253. See ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR PARKS AND WILDERNESS (James K. Agee &

Darryll R. Johnson eds., 1988).
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woodpecker or bark beetle, however,
a forest with hundreds of dead
25 4
trees is very healthy indeed.,
The moral considerability of all people, offuture people, and/or of
only people is, in other words, fundamental to any real estimation of
our collective priorities.255 Such considerations are deeply foreign to
the administrative process, though. ESA decisions are made in a
context that virtually precludes meaningful engagement on the big
questions, ensuring that the deliberations they entail are far too costly
for what they can possibly yield: a little help for a few taxa and a
little public education.256 The ESA has evolved to a point where its
quantitative aspirations are depleting and discrediting its
fundamentally qualitative substance because the steps that ought to
be decentralized and distributed are not, even while-at the same
time--decisions that ought to be made carefully and authoritatively
are over-abundant, over-partitioned, and lost in the commotion.
Ironically enough, it was work on a single carnivore population,
Yellowstone grizzlies, which pushed Agee and Johnson (and so many
others) to scale up their assessments and managerial ambitions a
generation ago.251 But it is a deeply political enterprise to raise the
priority questions and engage them and the actors they interest in a
full-scaled consideration of what we collectively view as desirable
future conditions. This is perhaps why the ESA has limped along for
eighteen years now without ever being reauthorized. 8 The risks in
so wide a political theatre--especially in the context of our anemic
political culture-seem too daunting. The temptation is to keep
finding Polar bears and using them as a kind of political judo.
254. Malcolm

L. Hunter Jr., Refining Normative Concepts in Conservation, 14

CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 573, 573 (2000).

255. For the record, I am deeply skeptical that we can rightly discount future lives. See,
e.g., John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population,29 J. LEGAL STUDS. 953, 970 (2000).
On the other hand, without doing so, the simple quantity of projected future lives quickly
dwarves our own satisfaction in comparison.
256. Note that, by IUCN's criteria, for example, at least a quarter of all mammal species
are at present risk of extinction. See Natasha Gilbert, A Quarterof Mammals Face Extinction,
455 NATURE 717 (Oct. 9, 2008).
257. See ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR PARKS AND WILDERNESS, supra note 253.
258. The statute has not been reauthorized since 1992. See Congressional Research
Service, Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act (ESA): A Comparison of Pending Bills
and Proposed Amendment with Current Law 1 (2006).
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Yet if we aspire to anything like broad-scale conservation, the
public's agents must find ways to study, describe, and propose the
means of resilience-not as their managerial ends, but rather as
robust and scalable metrics for everyone else to use. This would be a
mission tailored to the networked, data-driven, multi-agent
environments of today. Launching that mission would include (1) the
immediate conduct of several cross-cutting "value-of-information"
analyses; (2) the design and incremental specification of measurable
outcomes for various kinds of "protected areas"; (3) the development
of models that describe how the human, biological, physical, and
chemical components of the whole "earth system" interact; (4)
boosting the funding of basic research into the genetic and
evolutionary processes of speciation; and (5) sorting out and ordering
our now all-pervasive modes of "informal" regulation.
Taking them in order, "[a] fundamental aspect of decision-making
under uncertainty involves the inevitable choice between making an
immediate decision with the information and analysis available and
delaying the decision while, for example, more raw information is
collected..
,259 And several chronic sources of uncertainty across a
variety of ESA contexts are, at least in theory, eliminable. Yet the
Services have never developed generic methods for optimizing data
collection/analysis efforts based on the expected practical value of
the information to be gathered. 260 This kind of meta-analysis is now
26 1
standard in risk regulation, and it should be for biodiversity too.
259. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 82.
260. Demographic connectivity, for example, is an extremely promising-and underexplored-field. See Stephen R. Palumbi, PopulationGenetics, Demographic Connectivity,and
the Design of Marine Reserves, 13(1) ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS (Supplement) S 146 (2003).
A better understanding of demographic connectivity would enhance our ability to scale viability
analyses and threat assessments of different kinds. For information that is likely of high value in
ESA section 4 status changes and, in particular, priority ranking "candidate" species, the overall
representativeness and/or efficacy of surrogate ("keystone," "flagship," "umbrella," etc.)
species as managerial foci is another area the Services would both do well to investigate. See
T.M. Caro & Gillian O'Doherty, On the Use of SurrogateSpecies in Conservation Biology, 13
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 805 (1998).
261. Value-of-information ("VOI") analysis is decision-centric. "In a VOI analysis, an
information source is valued solely on the basis of the probability and magnitude of its potential
impacts on a specific decision at a specific time with a specific state of prior knowledge."
SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 82. Given the diversity of decision makers governing
habitat and other facets of conservation, this kind of analysis would inevitably draw in a range
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Second, a generation after reinterpreting our parks, refuges, and other
public lands as a network of so many "protected areas," we seem no
closer to a concrete understanding of their needs or long-term
performance. 262 Today, we know that protectedness is relative and
that a range of governance regimes encourage and discourage our
various uses of land. Yet, from tax-subsidized conservation
easements to critical habitat designations (barely restricting
governmental action itself) to the massive sanctuaries like
Yellowstone-and all manner of local and state variation in
between-protected areas today are a broad, deep category with
hardly any scalable metrics by which to benchmark their
performances. Enumerating such metrics and identifying the
thresholds at which these different regimes might actually pursue our
optima should be a high priority.263 Third, "it appears ... that we are
concentrating our monitoring efforts on species which most closely
resemble ourselves, in places where people with the most money and
spare time happen to live.''264 Even a crude understanding of complex
systems-and certainly our present knowledge of how tightly
coupled systems interact-rejects that strategy. Lacking the
panoramic data we need, though, the most we can do is to begin
modeling and funding more basic research into how natural
differentiation actually occurs.265

of partners as parameters must be defined and quantified. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
262. As I have argued elsewhere, the evidence we do have suggests that every protected
area loses species richness over time. See Colbum, supra note 23, at 453-65.
263. See, e.g., Malcolm L. Hunter, Jr. et al., Thresholds and the Mismatch Between
Environmental Laws and Ecosystems, 23 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1053, 1053 (2009).
264. Andrew Balmford et al., The 2010 Challenge: Data Availability, Information Needs
and Extraterrestrial Insights, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS BIOLOGICAL SCI. 221, 224 (2005).
265. See Andrew Balmford et al., The Convention on Biological Diversity's 2010 Target,
307 SCIENCE 212, 212-13 (Jan. 14, 2005) (arguing that the development of super-models that
collocate human, biological, physical, and chemical components of the whole "earth system"
would at least guide future data collection efforts). Likewise, the state of actual research
(largely simulations, models, and other mathematical gap-filling) into speciation and whether,
for example, physical barriers always play roles in genotypic or phenotypic differentiation,
remains primitive. See, e.g., M.A.M. de Aguiar et al., Global Patterns of Speciation and
Diversity, 460 NATURE 384 (July 16, 2009) (reporting simulation results suggesting physical
barriers are not necessary for speciation to occur and demographic stochasticity might be
sufficient). Four decades after MacArthur and Wilson published The Theory of Island
Biogeography, indeed, we still have but hypotheses on the basic relationships between
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Finally, the path-dependence of the Polar bear and lynx sagas
should remind us just how intertwined our normative and
informational troubles have become. As our agencies drift toward
increasingly informal modes of regulation, devices like the priority
ranking guidelines,26 6 DPS policy,2 67 and FWS's professed disfavor

of critical habitat designations,26 8 are guiding more and more legal
agents without governing them. 269 Never "enacted" as such, these
quasi-legal instruments are now affecting actions like listing
determinations in rather inscrutable ways. 7 ° If judicial review truly is
a core mode of holding government accountable, the precise point
and direction that these instruments enter into agency deliberations
must be made clearer.
CONCLUSIONS

Our deepest trouble is that risk has no antonym. The future of
biodiversity is a variety of loss scenarios-some worse than othersand the only thing that can turn these risks into facts is time. Risk is
an indexical expression of possible futures-one that implicitly
brackets debates about, or the mediation of, harms to the present as
such. Thus, to a significant degree, the normative considerations that
define consequences as good or bad are obscured in the quantification
of risk. And people bridle at the way such expressions constrain
them. But failing or refusing to quantify risk because it might
complicate the collective prioritizations we need to address risksbecause, for example, it "disempowers ' 271 the policymaker or the
populations and environments. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HUBBELL, THE UNIFIED NEUTRAL
THEORY OF BIODIVERSITY AND BIOGEOGRAPHY (2001).

266. See supranotes 201-06 and accompanying text.
267. See supranotes 100-08 and accompanying text.
268. See supranotes 111-15, 119-23, 128-39 and accompanying text.
269. See Colbum, Agency Interpretations,supra note 33.
270. FWS's infamous "Petition Management Guidance" highlighted this analytical
problem with the Services' "policies," "plans," and "guidelines." See Am. Lands Alliance v.
Norton, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003); cf Fischman, supra note 21, at 122 (arguing that
Service "policies" published as "notices" in the FederalRegister are more law-like than other
internal agency communications and bind the agency until validly repealed or amended because
they approximate the procedures set out in 5 U.S.C. § 553).
271. See Sinden, supranote 128, at 207.
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public-is to leave our troubles "hopelessly indeterminate" 272 just
because quantification is necessarily progressive by nature. I have
argued here that extinctions are a perfect example of how qualitative
and quantitative factoring can integrate as a matter of practical
agency. There are causes of extinction of which we are aware and
causes of which we are unaware. And no matter what we discover or
learn to measure, we never will be fully aware of all the possible
causes of extinction or of the losses it represents. Refusing to
enumerate and continuously refine the relevance of these different
choice factors even while their ordinal ranking(s) remain undone (or
provisional), though, is no more than a shabby pursuit of justice. 273 It
segregates one's actions from the many like-minded others whose
cooperation so often turns on the kind of accountability,
transparency, and communicative reciprocity that measurement and
quantity have delivered in the modem world.274 Other minds can
transform our understandings and experiences of quality and
quantity. Establishing productive terms on which to engage them and
their various cognitive advantages is our common challenge.
272. Sinden, supra note 128, at 210 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis "produces
hopelessly indeterminate results susceptible to easy challenge by anyone with the money to hire
a Ph.D economist"). Why it enhances determinacy to leave values unquantified-for Ph.D.
moral philosophers to debate, one supposes-is a mystery to me.
273. We can hardly appropriately value one another with deliberations that occlude the
very autonomous choices so central to our liberal commitments. See Steven M. DeLue, Public
Reason and Democracy: The Place of Science in Maintaining Civic Friendship, in SCIENTIFIC
VALUES AND CIVIC VIRTUES 25 (Noretta Koertge ed., 2005).
274. "Transparency [is] likely to be effective when the new information [it] generate[s] can
be easily embedded into the routines of information users and when information disclosers, in
turn, embed users' changed choices in their decision making in ways that advance public aims."
ARCHON FtJNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 17374 (2007); cf Mace et al., supra note 239, passim (arguing that the shift of 1UCN's Red List
Guidelines to quantitative criteria led to a transformative enhancement of their utility). "The
consequences of developing the new criteria have been far broader and deeper than could have
been anticipated in the 1980s. Apart from its many uses in species conservation, the IUCN Red
List is used in applied and theoretical conservation research, in legislation, and for national and
international conservation planning and priority setting." Id. at 1439.
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